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PRE-COMPETITION* 
JORGE L. CONTRERAS** & LIZA S. VERTINSKY*** 
As the costs of pharmaceutical research and development rise 
and concerns grow about the pace of innovation, both federal 
agencies and industry participants have turned to new forms of 
collaboration to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of 
biomedical research. Industry participants, many of them 
competitors, come together to define joint research and 
development objectives and to share project results in what are 
widely known as “pre-competitive” collaborations. There is a 
prevailing understanding among both industry and governmental 
actors that these pre-competitive endeavors are not only 
permissible, but encouraged. 
While the term “pre-competitive” is prevalent in the 
pharmaceutical industry, it is missing from the antitrust lexicon. 
Neither the courts nor the federal agencies charged with 
enforcing U.S. antitrust laws have ever recognized pre-
competitive activity as immune from antitrust challenge. Rather, 
antitrust regulators have repeatedly emphasized that when 
competitors collaborate, anticompetitive behavior may arise 
regardless of the stage at which collaborating occurs. 
This Article critically examines the phenomenon of pre-
competitive collaboration through an antitrust lens. It analyzes 
the apparent disconnect between the industry reliance on pre-
competition as a way of demarcating procompetitive 
arrangements among competitors, on the one hand, and the 
absence of any such distinction in antitrust law or practice, on the 
other. It then explores the ways that this disconnect may manifest 
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itself in the choice and structure of collaborative arrangements 
and suggests a framework for refocusing attention on 
collaborations that are procompetitive, irrespective of the stage of 
development. 
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Pre-competitive collaboration has become all the rage in some of 
today’s most competitive markets. Industries in which such collective 
activity has gained traction include semiconductors,1 advanced 
materials,2 nanotechnology,3 manufacturing,4 software,5 automotive,6 
and biotechnology and pharmaceuticals (“biopharma”).7 One recent 
survey commissioned by the Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) identified 
fifty significant pre-competitive collaborations in the biopharma 
industry alone,8 and the topic of pre-competitive collaboration has 
 
 1. See, e.g., Elias G. Carayannis & Jeffrey Alexander, Strategy, Structure, and 
Performance Issues of Precompetitive R&D Consortia: Insights and Lessons Learned from 
SEMATECH, 51 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ENGINEERING MGMT. 226, 226 (2004). 
 2. See, e.g., STEERING COMM. FOR NASA TECH. ROADMAPS & NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., NASA SPACE TECHNOLOGY ROADMAPS AND 
PRIORITIES: RESTORING NASA’S TECHNOLOGICAL EDGE AND PAVING THE WAY FOR 
A NEW ERA IN SPACE 82 (2012) (noting that NASA’s goals include making “appropriate 
efforts to develop pre-competitive technology relevant to the needs of the commercial 
space sector”). 
 3. See, e.g., NAT’L SCI. AND TECH. COUNCIL COMM. ON TECH. & SUBCOMM. ON 
NANOSCALE SCI., ENG’G, AND TECH., NATIONAL NANOTECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE 
STRATEGIC PLAN 11 (2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp
/nni_strategic_plan_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/PCU4-TLV8] (“Nanotechnology’s enormous 
potential to address global challenges relating to water, health, and energy renders it an 
ideal subject for collaboration on pre-competitive and non-competitive research.”); see 
also Theodore H. Wegner & Philip E. Jones, Advancing Cellulose-Based Nanotechnology, 
13 CELLULOSE 115, 116 (2006) (discussing the need for identifying pre-competitive 
technological needs as part of innovation strategy). 
 4. See, e.g., Gregory L. Smith & James C. Muller, PreAmp—A Pre-competitive 
Project in Intelligent Manufacturing Technology: An Architecture to Demonstrate 
Concurrent Engineering and Information Sharing, 2 CONCURRENT ENGINEERING 107, 
107 (1994) (describing pre-competitive R&D in the area of design and manufacturing of 
printed circuit assemblies). 
 5. STEPHEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE 21 (2004) (characterizing pre-
competitive collaboration in the software industry as “[c]ompetitors shar[ing] early stages 
of research that benefit all”). 
 6. See Sean Elkins et al., Four Disruptive Strategies for Removing Drug Discovery 
Bottlenecks, 18 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 265, 268 (2013). 
 7. See infra Part I. 
 8. Jill S. Altschuler et al., Opening Up to Precompetitive Collaboration, 2 SCI. 
TRANSLATIONAL MED. 1, 1 (2010). 
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been the focus of at least two major IOM studies in the last five 
years.9 
In this context, the term “pre-competitive” connotes early-stage 
research and development (“R&D”) that is directed to non-product 
specific research tools or data with the goal of benefitting the entire 
industry rather than a single firm.10 In theory, pre-competitive 
collaboration enables competitors to pool resources, know-how, and 
intellectual property to advance the emergence of cutting edge 
technologies, collect and disseminate data, develop common research 
platforms and standards, and tackle other problems that are common 
across an industry.11 
These perceived benefits have attracted the interest of U.S. 
governmental agencies, and many pre-competitive collaborations 
have been encouraged by the agencies that regulate or otherwise 
oversee the industries in which they are formed. The first prominent 
pre-competitive research consortia were formed in the 1980s in the 
U.S. computer industry to support a government-backed strategy for 
meeting global competition.12 Around the same time, the Department 
of Defense played an integral role in forming Sematech, a 
semiconductor industry consortium organized to enhance the 
 
 9. For copies of both of these studies, see generally INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L 
ACADS., EXTENDING THE SPECTRUM OF PRECOMPETITIVE COLLABORATION IN 
ONCOLOGY RESEARCH (2010) [hereinafter IOM 2010 REPORT]; INST. OF MED. OF THE 
NAT’L ACADS., ESTABLISHING PRECOMPETITIVE COLLABORATIONS TO STIMULATE 
GENOMICS-DRIVEN PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT (2011) [hereinafter IOM 2011 REPORT]. 
 10. See IOM 2010 REPORT, supra note 9, at 1 (defining pre-competitive collaboration 
as “basic and preclinical research on drug targets and the early stages of clinical testing”); 
Liza S. Vertinsky, Patents, Partnerships, and the Pre-Competition Collaboration Myth in 
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1509, 1516 (2015) (defining pre-
competitive collaboration as “early stage research where the knowledge, results, and 
materials that are shared do not—at least purportedly—confer a competitive advantage by 
being shared”). 
 11. See Altschuler et al., supra note 8, at 1. Analogies can be drawn to industry-wide 
collaborations in the design and adoption of technical interoperability standards such as 
Wi-Fi, USB, and LTE in which competitors work together to establish common protocols 
that enable different vendors’ products to interoperate in a seamless manner. See generally 
CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE 
NETWORK ECONOMY (1999) (discussing the role cooperation and compatibility play in a 
network economy). 
 12. See, e.g., NORMAN S. ZIMBEL, COOPERATION MEETS COMPETITION: THE 
IMPACT OF CONSORTIA FOR PRECOMPETITIVE R&D IN THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY, 
1982–92, at v (1992), http://www.pirp.harvard.edu/pubs_pdf/zimbel/zimbel-p92-10.pdf [https://
perma.cc/T66X-DWBX] (discussing the study of the evolution of U.S. pre-competitive 
research consortia for high-performance computing in the 1980s and 90s). 
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competitiveness of the U.S. semiconductor industry.13 Since then, a 
range of governmental agencies including the National Institutes of 
Health (“NIH”), Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), National 
Science Foundation (“NSF”), and National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (“NASA”) have facilitated the formation of pre-
competitive consortia and collaborations seeking to advance R&D in 
the domains that they oversee.14 While many of these efforts have 
focused on basic science and discovery, there has been an increasing 
emphasis on activities more closely connected with product 
development. Pressure to move collaborations downstream into areas 
closer to commercial development has come from both government 
actors eager to show concrete economic results from public R&D 
investments and from private firms concerned about filling their 
product pipelines while controlling cost and risk.15 
This focus on pre-competitive, product-directed R&D has been 
particularly pronounced in the biopharma industry, in which 
productivity challenges are increasingly pushing competitors into 
collaboration. Joint activity among competitors in this industry is not 
only tolerated, but encouraged, by governmental agencies that 
oversee the industry, so long as it occurs in areas deemed to be pre-
competitive.16 The theory, presumably, is that such collective activities 
benefit the entire industry rather than an individual firm and must 
therefore avoid antitrust concerns. Consequently, as comfort with 
pre-competitive collaborations has grown in the biopharma industry, 
both governmental agencies and private firms increasingly operate as 
if an antitrust “safe harbor” exists for pre-competitive collaboration.17 
 
 13. See generally Douglas A. Irwin & Peter J. Klenow, Sematech: Purpose and 
Performance, 93 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 12,739 (1996) (noting how the U.S. government 
financially backed the semiconductor industry leading to the formation of Sematech). 
 14. With respect to the NIH and FDA, see infra Part I. NASA has employed pre-
competitive collaborations as part of its aeronautics program. See, e.g., LISA PORTER, 
NASA’S NEW AERONAUTICS RESEARCH PROGRAM 5 (2007), http://www.hq.nasa.gov
/office/aero/pdf/armd_overview_reno_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/58JC-532Y]. NSF has supported 
pre-competitive R&D strategies through programs such as the Industry/University 
Cooperative Research Centers program. See Industry/University Cooperative Research 
Centers Program (I/UCRC), NAT’L SCI. FOUND., https://www.nsf.gov/funding
/pgm_summ.jsp?pims_id=5501 [https://perma.cc/V3HF-HFLB]. 
 15. See Editorial, Expanding Precompetitive Space, 10 NATURE REVS. DRUG 
DISCOVERY 883, 883 (2011); see also Altschuler et al., supra note 8, at 1 (citing increasing 
numbers of collaborations “at the product-development end of the R&D value chain”). 
 16. See discussion and examples infra Section I.A. 
 17. Though not addressed in any detail, some groups in the biopharma industry have 
begun to acknowledge a need for antitrust review of certain collaborations among 
competitors. See, e.g., IOM 2010 REPORT, supra note 9, at 33 (“Concerns over privacy, 
conflict of interest, antitrust law, and the sharing of international data can inhibit pre-
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Despite the frequent invocation of the term “pre-competitive” by 
firms and agencies in the biopharma sector, the term has little, if any, 
purchase in the literature or doctrine of antitrust law. In fact, as far as 
determinable, no U.S. antitrust statute, regulation, agency guidance, 
consent decree, or judicial decision has ever recognized or even 
sought to define “pre-competition” or “pre-competitive” activity. 
More importantly, neither the courts nor federal antitrust agencies 
have designated pre-competitive activity as immune from antitrust 
challenge.18 In fact, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) have expressly identified the potential 
for anticompetitive R&D arrangements in markets before the 
emergence of defined products (so-called “innovation markets” or 
“R&D markets”).19 
 
competitive collaborations.”); INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., SHARING CLINICAL 
TRIAL DATA: MAXIMIZING BENEFITS, MINIMIZING RISK 190 (2015) (describing antitrust 
issues addressed by author Jorge Contreras at IOM panel discussion of clinical trials data 
sharing). 
 18. The National Cooperative Research and Production Act (NCRPA), 15 U.S.C. 
§§	4301–06 (2012), permits firms that wish to engage in joint research or production to 
make a public notification listing their names and the scope of their joint activity, 
whereupon they are granted immunity from certain antitrust remedies, including treble 
damages under the Sherman Act. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 19. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR 
THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 10–11 (1995) [hereinafter IP LICENSING 
GUIDELINES]. As part of their analysis of relevant markets within which to assess 
competition, the DOJ and FTC refer in the IP Licensing Guidelines to three kinds of 
markets: product markets, technology markets, and innovation markets. Id. at 8, 10. A 
proposed update to the IP Licensing Guidelines was released by the FTC and DOJ for 
public comment on August 12, 2016. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PROPOSED 
UPDATE—REDLINE (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/antitrust-
guidelines-licensing-intellectual-property-proposed-update-1995-guidelines-issued-us
/ip_guidelines_published_proposed_update.pdf [https://perma.cc/PX66-R6LG] [hereinafter 
IP LICENSING GUIDELINES PROPOSED UPDATE]. The IP Licensing Guidelines Proposed 
Update replace the term “innovation markets” with “research and development 
market[s].” Id. at 15–17. This change is not intended to be substantive, but rather a 
clarification of how these markets have actually been defined in enforcement actions. See, 
e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC and DOJ Seek View on Proposed Update of 
the Antitrust Guidelines for Licensing Intellectual Property (Aug. 12, 2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/08/ftc-doj-seek-views-proposed-update
-antitrust-guidelines-licensing [https://perma.cc/F4RV-CTR8]. The Antitrust Guidelines for 
Collaborations Among Competitors issued by the FTC and the DOJ in April 2000 still refer 
to “innovation markets” through reference to the IP Licensing Guidelines. FED. TRADE 
COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS 
AMONG COMPETITORS, §	3.32(c), at 17 (2000) [hereinafter COLLABORATION 
GUIDELINES]. Section 3.32(c), Research and Development: Innovation Markets, refers to 
section 3.2.3 of the IP Licensing Guidelines. Id. In this Article we use the terminology of 
the IP Licensing Guidelines Proposed Update, referring to “research and development 
markets” rather than “innovation markets.” See Market Definition in Antitrust: Theory 
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This Article critically examines the phenomenon of pre-
competitive collaboration through an antitrust lens.20 The authors 
observe that while many pre-competitive collaborations may indeed 
offer procompetitive benefits and thereby avoid antitrust concern, it 
is not the case that every collaboration conducted prior to product 
release or as part of a common technology platform will be immune 
from antitrust condemnation. Accordingly, the tendency to focus on 
pre-competitive collaborations as inherently procompetitive and 
deserving of some form of antitrust safe harbor is misguided. And far 
from being benign, this misconception has the potential both to 
encourage early-stage collaborations that may in fact be 
anticompetitive, and to discourage later-stage, yet manifestly 
procompetitive, collaborations. This Article focuses on the biopharma 
industry because of the prominent role that pre-competitive 
collaboration has taken in the policy debate over the spiraling costs of 
drug development and the enthusiasm with which the NIH, the FDA, 
and private firms have embraced the pre-competitive model. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a detailed 
analysis of pre-competitive collaboration in the biopharma sector. 
This Part addresses the market pressures that have led competitors to 
collaborate, as well as the policy goals of agencies in actively 
promoting such collaborations. It then offers three case studies 
illustrating the objectives, organizational structure, and collaborative 
activity of biopharma pre-competitive collaborations at different 
stages along the product commercialization path: (1) the SNP 
Consortium, an early-stage basic science collaboration that worked 
alongside the Human Genome Project to release DNA marker data 
to the public; (2) the international Serious Adverse Events 
Consortium, a jointly-funded industry effort to identify genetic 
markers for adverse reactions to existing therapeutics; and (3) the 
Accelerating Medicines Partnership, a collaboration among 
pharmaceutical firms to identify drug targets for four identified 
disease categories. 
Part II outlines the legal framework established by the U.S. 
courts and antitrust enforcement agencies to analyze horizontal 
arrangements among competitors, particularly those involving the 
licensing of intellectual property and the conduct of R&D. It looks 
 
and Case Studies, 2012 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L. 471, 471 (using the terminology of 
“innovation markets” as well). 
 20. While previous authors have analyzed the antitrust implications of specific 
industry collaborations, their focus has not been on the general practice of pre-competitive 
collaboration. See, e.g., Irwin & Klenow, supra note 13, at 12,740–41. 
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specifically at the agencies’ analyses of R&D markets,21 much of 
which has occurred in the context of merger transactions within the 
pharmaceutical industry. Part II examines the factors that these 
agencies weighed to determine whether an R&D collaboration may 
be considered procompetitive or anticompetitive. 
Part III applies this established antitrust framework to pre-
competitive collaborations at different stages along the product 
development cycle. It uses hypothetical examples to illustrate the 
disconnect between current industry understandings and uses of pre-
competitive collaborations and the actual analysis conducted by 
courts and agencies to determine whether R&D collaborations 
among competitors are procompetitive or anticompetitive. This Part 
goes on to identify measures that may reduce antitrust concerns in 
such collaborations. 
The Article concludes by urging both industry participants and 
governmental agencies to evaluate more closely the potential 
procompetitive and anticompetitive features of any proposed industry 
collaboration, and not simply to rely on a conclusory characterization 
of such activities as pre-competitive or to presumptively favor pre-
competitive collaborations over collaborations at later stages of 
product or market development. 
I.  PRE-COMPETITIVE COLLABORATIONS AS INNOVATION 
STRATEGIES 
Rising costs, shrinking budgets, massive risks of failure at even 
late stages of drug development, and the complexity of those diseases 
that are still in need of treatments are forcing pharmaceutical firms to 
search for new approaches to drug discovery and development.22 In 
the past, pharmaceutical companies have worked largely in silos, 
 
 21. This Article relies on the IP Licensing Guidelines as a description of the analytical 
framework that the FTC and DOJ apply in the context of arrangements involving 
intellectual property licenses. As discussed in note 19, supra, a draft update to these 
guidelines, the IP Licensing Guidelines Proposed Update, has been released for comment. 
While the IP Licensing Guidelines Proposed Update were, at the time this Article went to 
press, still in draft form and may change, this Article adopts their updated terminology 
and refers to R&D markets in place of innovation markets. 
 22. For a discussion of the challenges facing traditional models of pharmaceutical 
development and the need for change, see Mark Kessel, The Problem with Today’s 
Pharmaceutical Business—an Outsider’s View, 29 NATURE BIOTECH. 27, 27–28, 30 (2011); 
see also Janet Woodcock, Precompetitive Research: A New Prescription for Drug 
Development?, 87 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 521, 522–23 (2010). 
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pursuing closed, highly secretive drug discovery and development.23 
But the traditional fully integrated business models that large 
pharmaceutical firms have relied upon for decades are no longer 
either efficient or sustainable.24 The decline in the productivity of 
pharmaceutical R&D is well documented.25 The number of new FDA 
approved drugs per billion dollars of R&D spending roughly halved 
every nine years between 1950 and 2010.26 Although the total number 
of new drug approvals by the FDA has increased since 2010, many of 
the new drug approvals are for orphan drugs that have huge price 
tags, significant tax incentives and regulatory support, and very small 
patient populations.27 Meanwhile, private sector investments in 
disease areas with the largest public health burdens in the United 
States, such as certain types of cancer, diabetes, and Alzheimer’s 
disease, remain stagnant at best, and the results of development 
efforts remain disappointing.28 Both public sector actors, such as the 
 
 23. See, e.g., Barbara Mittleman, Garry Neil & Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 
Precompetitive Consortia in Biomedicine—How Are We Doing?, 31 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 979, 980 (2013). 
 24. See, e.g., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, PHARMA 2020: CHALLENGING 
BUSINESS MODELS 1–4 (2009). 
 25. See, e.g., Bernard Munos, Lessons from 60 Years of Pharmaceutical Innovation, 8 
NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 959, 959 (2009) (presenting corporate perspective on 
the problem, suggesting that lack of growth in drug-output ratio may reflect limits of 
current R&D model); Fabio Pammolli, Laura Magazzini & Massimo Riccaboni, The 
Productivity Crisis in Pharmaceutical R&D, 10 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 428, 
428 (2011) (examining the decline in pharmaceutical R&D productivity using a large 
database of R&D projects); Jack W. Scannell et al., Diagnosing the Decline in 
Pharmaceutical R&D Efficiency, 11 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 191, 191–92 
(2012) (surveying literature examining the decline in pharmaceutical R&D productivity). 
But see Iain M. Cockburn, Is the Pharmaceutical Industry in a Productivity Crisis?, in 7 
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 1, 1–4 (Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2007) 
(acknowledging the problem of the rising cost per new drug, but suggesting that trends of 
decline are exaggerated). 
 26. See, e.g., Scannell et al., supra note 25, at 191 (suggesting that the pharmaceutical 
industry is following “Eroom’s Law” (Moore spelled backwards), when it comes to 
productivity growth). 
 27. For a summary of new drug approvals over the past decade, see U.S. FOOD AND 
DRUG ADMIN. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, NOVEL NEW DRUGS 
2014 SUMMARY 1–3 (2015). For a discussion of the shift towards niche market strategies 
focusing on orphan diseases, see Ashish Kumar Kakkar & Neha Dahiya, The Evolving 
Drug Development Landscape: From Blockbusters to Niche Busters in the Orphan Drug 
Space, 75 DRUG DEV. RES. 231, 231 (2014). See also Elie Dolgin, Big Pharma Moves from 
‘Blockbusters’ to ‘Niche Busters’, 16 NATURE MED. 837, 837 (2010). For a discussion of the 
high pricing of orphan drugs, see John-Paul Michaud, Robin Modi & M. Ian Phillips, Is 
Orphan Drug Pricing Blowing a Bubble? The Unique Situation of Orphan Drugs and Why 
High Prices Will Likely Persist, 1 EXPERT OPINION ON ORPHAN DRUGS 675, 675 (2013). 
 28. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE 
OF THE PRESIDENT, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON PROPELLING INNOVATION IN 
DRUG DISCOVERY, DEVELOPMENT, AND EVALUATION, at vi–ix (2012); SOEREN 
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NIH and publicly funded institutions such as universities and 
academic medical centers, are facing their own fiscal woes, limiting 
their ability to contribute to costly R&D ventures.29 The decline in 
productivity, along with the growing disconnect between the size of 
investment flows and the magnitude of unmet medical needs, have 
been of immense concern to the NIH, the FDA, and other public 
sector stakeholders.30 
The challenges facing the U.S. biopharma industry come at a 
time when breakthroughs in science and technology should be leading 
to rapid progress in drug discovery and development.31 There have 
been major scientific advances in our understanding of the nature and 
causes of different diseases, in some cases leading to entirely new 
disease classifications and strategies for interventions.32 Tools for 
biomedical research have become increasingly powerful, enabling 
advances including the sequencing of the human genome, the 
mapping of individual genetic variations, the study of genes in new 
animal models, and the ability to monitor and study proteins and 
measure cellular responses.33 Translating these breakthroughs into a 
new generation of medical therapies has, however, been frustratingly 
slow.34 
 
MATTKE ET AL., RAND CORP., THE NEW NEGLECTED DISEASES? 4 (2013), http://www
.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE117/RAND_PE117.pdf [https://
perma.cc/A9BY-WNGB] (explaining why pharmaceutical companies invest less money in 
developing drugs for common diseases such as Alzheimer’s). 
 29. See, e.g., Richard Harris & Robert Benincasa, U.S. Science Suffering from Booms 
and Busts in Funding, NPR (Sept. 9, 2014, 3:03 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2014/09/09/340716091/u-s-science-suffering-from-booms-and-busts-in-funding [https://
perma.cc/EVM4-VFXA]; Melissa Korn, Once Cash Cows, University Hospitals Now 
Source of Worry for Schools, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2015, 4:40 PM), http://www.wsj.com
/articles/universities-get-second-opinion-on-their-hospitals-1429725107. 
 30. See, e.g., Eduardo Porter, A Dearth in Innovation for Key Drugs, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/23/business/a-dearth-of-investment-in-
much-needed-drugs.html [https://perma.cc/G5ZD-6URD] (suggesting that firms are 
flocking to rare diseases because development is cheaper and profits are higher, leaving 
behind some of the disease areas with the biggest public health costs); see also 
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 28, at vii–viii. 
 31. See, e.g., Sally Rockey & Francis Collins, One Nation in Support of Biomedical 
Research?, NIH DIRECTOR’S BLOG (Sept. 24, 2013), https://directorsblog.nih.gov/2013/09
/24/one-nation-in-support-of-biomedical-research/ [https://perma.cc/GL4Q-W9UG]. 
 32. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 28, at vi. 
 33. Id. at 5–6. 
 34. See, e.g., John Carroll, “Frustrated” NIH Chief Plots $1B Drug Development 
Effort, FIERCEBIOTECH (Jan. 24, 2011, 8:18 AM), http://www.fiercebiotech.com/story
/frustrated-nih-chief-plots-1b-drug-development-effort/2011-01-24 [https://perma.cc/WX9J-
PSQJ] (discussing Francis Collins’s announced frustration with private sector translation 
efforts and his plan to support translational efforts through the new National Center for 
Advancing Translational Sciences). 
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A. Emergence of Pre-Competitive Strategies in Biopharma 
Pharmaceutical firms have a long history of collaborating with 
academic researchers in early stages of R&D, but the recent 
combination of constrained resources, rising costs, unmet medical 
needs, and expansive scientific opportunities has fueled an increased 
interest in collaboration in both the public and private sectors.35 
While some pharmaceutical industry collaborations are simply efforts 
to expand traditional partnering arrangements between industry and 
academia, there has been a significant expansion of alternative 
models of cross-industry collaboration including strategic alliances, 
open innovation approaches, and—increasingly—what the biopharma 
industry refers to as pre-competitive collaborations.36 
Genomics was home to the earliest and largest efforts to 
collaborate in pre-competitive space. The groundwork for this 
collaboration was laid by the Human Genome Project (“HGP”), the 
ambitious, multinational, publicly funded project that raced private 
sector efforts to sequence the human genome in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s.37 As a publicly funded project shaped by principles of 
open access and knowledge sharing, the HGP insisted that its 
participating sequencing centers release all human sequence data to 
the public within twenty-four hours after being generated under a 
data release protocol known as the Bermuda Principles.38 Eventually, 
even the private sector participants in the race to sequence the 
 
 35. See, e.g., John A. Wagner, Open-Minded to Open Innovation and Precompetitive 
Collaboration, 87 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 511, 514 (2010) 
(“Precompetitive collaboration is increasingly recognized as a driver for enhanced 
efficiency, while simultaneously increasing our grasp of heightened complexity.”). 
 36. See, e.g., Isa Khanna, Drug Discovery in Pharmaceutical Industry: Productivity 
Challenges and Trends, 17 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 1088, 1093–94 tbl.1 (cataloging 
numerous precompetitive collaborations in the biopharma industry); Mittleman et al., 
supra note 23, at 979–80 (identifying five strategic avenues of industry innovation, 
including independent operation, mergers and aquisitions, and three cooperative models); 
Asher Mullard, Partnering Between Pharma Peers on the Rise, 10 NATURE REVS. DRUG 
DISCOVERY 561, 561–62 (2011) (discussing growth in pharma-pharma collaborations, 
including analysis of an early model provided by the Dundee Kinase Consortium). 
 37. For general histories of the HGP, see generally JAMES SHREEVE, THE GENOME 
WAR (2004) and VICTOR K. MCELHENY, DRAWING THE MAP OF LIFE—INSIDE THE 
HUMAN GENOME PROJECT (2010). Planning for the HGP began in the late 1980s and is 
generally agreed to have concluded the early 2000s, though work continues to refine the 
human genomic map. MCELHENY, supra, at ix–x. 
 38. Summary of Principles Agreed at the First International Strategy Meeting on 
Human Genome Sequencing, HUMAN GENOME PROJECT INFO. ARCHIVE, http://
www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/research/bermuda.shtml [https://perma.cc
/NQX4-UDVQ]; see also Jorge L. Contreras, Bermuda’s Legacy: Policy, Patents, and the 
Design of the Genome Commons, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 84–85 (2011). 
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genome were persuaded to deposit their sequence data in the publicly 
accessible GenBank database.39 
Much has been written about the scientific advances enabled by 
the culture of rapid and widespread data sharing fostered by the 
HGP.40 This data sharing ethos spread from the government and 
academic labs first involved in the HGP to select industry research 
labs, resulting in a series of innovative pre-competitive data sharing 
initiatives that sought to preserve free and unrestricted access to basic 
information about the human genome. Public efforts to sequence the 
human genome were thus accompanied by industry-driven 
and-funded collaborations designed to gather and make additional 
genomic data public, often in efforts to preempt the patenting of 
genetic information by others.41 One prominent example was the SNP 
Consortium (“TSC”), an early stage, basic science collaboration that 
worked alongside the HGP to release DNA marker data to the 
public.42 
In these early collaborations, the term “pre-competitive” was 
used largely to refer to the nature of the genomic data that was being 
gathered and shared. Genomic data was seen as constituting a base of 
common scientific knowledge upon which firms could later build 
competitive product and service offerings. Innovations in the ways 
that genomics data could be created, gathered, sorted, and shared 
facilitated the growth of genomics-based cross-industry initiatives.43 
 
 39. See Contreras, supra note 38, at 85 n.101. 
 40. See, e.g., Francis Collins, Opinion: Has the Revolution Arrived?, 464 NATURE 674, 
675 (referring to the “radical ethic of immediate data deposit adopted by the [HGP]” as 
the current “norm for other community research projects”); Jane Kaye et al., Data Sharing 
in Genomics—Re-shaping Scientific Practice, 10 NATURE REVS. GENETICS 331, 332 box 1 
(2009) (“These policies have created a climate in which data sharing has become the 
default, and [grant] applicants must demonstrate why their data should be exempt from 
the requirement that it should be deposited for use by other scientists.”); Nikos C. 
Kyrpides, Fifteen Years of Microbial Genomics: Meeting the Challenges and Fulfilling the 
Dream, 27 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 627, 627 (2009) (“Over time, as the substantial 
benefits of prepublication release of genome data have been recognized, many funding 
agencies and most of the large sequencing centers now adhere to the rapid data release 
policy set forth as the Bermuda Principles in 1996 and renewed in 2003.”); Heidi L. 
Williams, Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation: Evidence from the Human Genome, 
121 J. POL. ECON., no. 1, 2013, at 1, 1, http://economics.mit.edu/files/8647 [https://perma.cc
/WB5J-3YVH]. 
 41. See Contreras, supra note 38, at 85–86. 
 42. See infra Section I.C.1. 
 43. For a discussion of some of these data sharing initiatives, see Nicole Szlezak et al., 
The Role of Big Data and Advanced Analytics in Drug Discovery, Development and 
Commercialization, 95 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 492, 492 (2014); 
Robin Robinson, A New Era of Collaboration: Knowledge Sharing, PHARMAVOICE (Oct. 
2014), http://www.pharmavoice.com/article/knowledge-sharing/ [https://perma.cc/L2GD-3JDP]. 
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These early pre-competitive collaborations informed strategies to 
create similar open and shared spaces in other areas of biomedical 
R&D. 
Budget constraints and soaring development costs made pre-
competitive strategies attractive to pharmaceutical firms in areas 
beyond genomics because of the strategies’ efficiency.44 Such 
strategies appeal to firms eager to distribute the costs and risks 
involved in R&D among multiple industry participants in ways that 
do not compromise their own competitive advantages.45 
Pre-competitive collaborations have also been attractive to 
government policymakers interested in accelerating pharmaceutical 
innovation in cost effective ways.46 Dr. Francis Collins, as director of 
the National Human Genome Research Institute from 1993 to 2008, 
was an early advocate of pre-competitive collaborations as a 
mechanism for accelerating biomedical research.47 As the current 
director of the NIH, Dr. Collins continues to advocate for pre-
competitive collaboration strategies to identify promising therapeutic 
targets and biomarkers.48 The Accelerating Medicines Partnership 
(“AMP”), a collaboration among pharmaceutical firms and the NIH 
 
 44. See, e.g., Sally Rockey & Francis Collins, One Nation in Support of Biomedical 
Research?, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (Sept. 24, 2013), https://nexus.od.nih.gov/all/2013/09
/24/one-nation-in-support-of-biomedical-research/ [https://perma.cc/G6P6-VVNS]; see also 
Hamilton Moses et al., The Anatomy of Medical Research: US and International 
Comparisons, 313 JAMA 174, 174, 185 (2015) (examining trends in U.S. and international 
research funding, showing a decline in growth of U.S. funding and a shift away from early-
stage research funding, and suggesting the United States will lose its lead in biomedical 
innovation without a change in investment trends). 
 45. See IOM 2011 REPORT, supra note 9, at 10–19 (examining examples from other 
industries engaging in pre-competitive collaborations and identifying best practices and a 
framework for cross-industry sharing of biological resources). 
 46. See generally Jorge L. Contreras, Leviathan in the Commons: Biomedical Data and 
the State, in GOVERNING MEDICAL RESEARCH COMMONS (Brett Frischmann, Michael 
Madison & Katherine Strandburg eds., Oxford Univ. Press, forthcoming 2017) (discussing 
governmental interventions in biomedical data generation projects in fields including 
genomics and clinical trials). 
 47. See, e.g., Francis S. Collins et al., A Vision for the Future of Genomics Research, 
422 NATURE 835, 839, 844 (2003). 
 48. See, e.g., Continuing America’s Leadership in Medical Innovation for Patients: 
Hearing Before the S. Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions Comm., 114th Cong. 4 (2015), 
http://www.nih.gov/about-nih/who-we-are/nih-director/continuing-americas-leadership-
medical-innovation-patients [https://perma.cc/HB9H-YD3R] (testimony of Francis S. 
Collins, Director, National Institutes of Health) (discussing Accelerating Medicines 
Partnership, a pre-competitive partnership, with the hope that “[t]hrough this truly 
innovative and collaborative approach, we believe we can learn how to treat and cure 
disease faster”). 
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to identify drug targets for four identified disease categories, provides 
one example.49 
The FDA has also tried to generate private interest in pre-
competitive collaboration within the biopharma sector. The Critical 
Path Initiative (“CPI”), launched by the FDA in 2004, provides a 
concrete example of the FDA’s commitment to fostering pre-
competitive collaborations as part of a larger mission of 
“[t]ransforming the way FDA-regulated products are developed, 
evaluated and manufactured.”50 The primary goal of the CPI was to 
encourage industry members to share data, expertise, and resources 
in order to produce more reliable testing methods.51 As part of these 
efforts, the FDA subsequently formed the Critical Path Institute, a 
nonprofit organization charged with identifying and seeking to 
overcome barriers to industry collaboration to address what it 
characterized as “pre-competitive regulatory science issues,” 
“focusing on standards, applied science, and technology that advance 
the field for all stakeholders and benefit the public.”52 
In line with the goals of the CPI and the efforts of the Critical 
Path Institute, the FDA has subsequently sought to foster pre-
competitive collaboration through both direct funding of partnerships 
and indirect, but public, support of pharmaceutical industry 
initiatives.53 One such initiative is the international Serious Adverse 
Events Consortium (“iSAEC”), which has sought to identify and 
release to the public genetic markers associated with serious adverse 
drug reactions, an area that is central to the FDA’s public health and 
safety mission.54 In each of these instances, the status of an activity as 
pre-competitive has played a role in the FDA support. The next 
 
 49. See Vertinsky, supra note 10, at 1549; see also infra Section I.C.3. 
 50. See Critical Path Initiative, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov
/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/CriticalPathInitiative/ [https://perma.cc/48NL-G6YC] (last 
updated Oct. 23, 2015). 
 51. See, e.g., Raymond L. Woosley, Richard T. Myers & Federico Goodsaid, The 
Critical Path Institute’s Approach to Pre-competitive Sharing and Advancing Regulatory 
Science, 87 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 530, 530–31 (2010). 
 52. See, e.g., id. 
 53. See generally, e.g., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CRITICAL PATH INITIATIVE REPORT ON 
PROJECTS RECEIVING CRITICAL PATH SUPPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2010 REPORT (2010), http://
www.fda.gov/downloads/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/CriticalPathInitiative/UCM249262
.pdf [https://perma.cc/NMX6-5LXN] (reporting on projects supported by CPI during the 
2010 fiscal year). 
 54. See infra Section I.C.2.; see also Arthur L. Holden et al., The International Serious 
Adverse Events Consortium, 13 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 795, 795 (2014); 
Contreras, supra note 46, at 18 (discussing the FDA’s role in iSAEC). 
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Section discusses the evolving understanding of the term “pre-
competitive” in the biopharma industry. 
B. Evolving Uses of the Term “Pre-Competitive” 
Although the term “pre-competitive” is used widely in the 
biopharma literature, it does not have a single, generally accepted 
definition. A survey of ways in which the biopharma industry is using 
the term suggests a common industry understanding of pre-
competitive as covering activities and results that are generated 
through a cooperative process by industry stakeholders and which 
have broad application to the industry as a whole.55 To illustrate, a 
sample of definitions of pre-competitive provided by pharmaceutical 
firms, FDA commentators, and NIH commentators includes: “science 
participated in collaboratively by those who ordinarily are 
commercial competitors,”56 “competitors sharing early stages of 
research that benefit all,”57 collaborations involved in “aggregating, 
accessing, and sharing data that are essential to innovation, but 
provide little competitive advantage,”58 and “standards, data, or 
processes that are common across an industry and where the 
adoption, use, or prosecution of which provides no competitive 
advantage relative to peers.”59 In the descriptions provided by 
industry stakeholders, pre-competitive collaborations are almost 
always portrayed as complements to market competition,60 allowing 
firms to pool costs and risks in areas that offer little individual 
competitive advantage in order to enhance competition in 
 
 55. Our informal survey of the use of the term included a literature search of 
biopharma industry publications, NIH, FDA, and federal government policy papers, and 
participation in conference presentations and workshops involving the study and 
evaluation of some of the existing pre-competitive collaborations. 
 56. Woodcock, supra note 22, at 521 (describing emergence of pre-competitive 
collaborations in biomedicine and their defining features). 
 57. See, e.g., John A. Wagner et al., The Biomarkers Consortium: Practice and Pitfalls 
of Open-Source Precompetitive Collaboration, 87 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & 
THERAPEUTICS 539, 539 (2010) (describing the Biomarkers Consortium as one example 
of a pre-competitive collaboration that is driving innovation and increasing productivity). 
 58. See About the Pistoia Alliance, PISTOIA ALLIANCE, http://www.pistoiaalliance.org
/about/ [https://perma.cc/W8R7-7SLS] (describing the alliance’s mission to transform 
R&D innovation through pre-competitive collaboration). 
 59. See Chris Waller, Precompetitive Collaborations 2 (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www
.slideshare.net/wallerc/precompetitive-collaborations [https://perma.cc/J8Z4-8QAB]. 
 60. See, e.g., Mittleman et al., supra note 23, at 979 (“[D]espite the formation of 
consortia as a complement to market competition and government regulation in recent 
years, too few [consortia] exist to mitigate lost opportunities and deliver on other potential 
mutual gains for public and private stakeholders in the drug development enterprise.”). 
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downstream areas where they can most effectively exploit their 
competitive advantages. 
From this shared starting point, various definitions of pre-
competition within the biopharma literature emphasize one or more 
of the following aspects of the collaboration: (1) the types of 
activities, data, or research plans that are being shared; (2) the rules 
governing the protection and sharing of results; and (3) the nature of 
the participants within the collaboration. 
Many definitions of pre-competition, including those offered by 
pharmaceutical firms when describing their own initiatives, focus on 
the first category: the nature of the activity or type of data being 
shared, designating certain activities and types of data as pre-
competitive. As noted above, early pre-competitive collaborations in 
the biopharma industry focused on collecting and sharing data about 
the human genome, which was considered by many industry 
stakeholders to be “fundamentally pre-competitive information.”61 
Technologies enabling the accumulation of massive amounts of 
biological data have heralded the growth of “Big Data” opportunities 
in drug discovery and development, but harnessing the benefits of big 
data for pharmaceutical R&D requires collaboration in data pooling, 
data sharing, and the development of tools for effective data use.62 
Some definitions of pre-competition focus on the distinction between 
pre-competitive tools and resulting products, further distinguishing 
between technologies that are tied to differentiating strategies and 
those that are generally enabling with potential wide use across the 
industry.63 This effort to differentiate based on the type of technology 
depends heavily on the perspectives of different stakeholders, 
however, since many of the tools regarded as generally enabling 
inputs by pharmaceutical companies are the object of intense 
competition by those producing the tools.64 
 
 61. See, e.g., Francis S. Collins, Michael Morgan & Aristides Patrinos, The Human 
Genome Project: Lessons from Large-Scale Biology, 300 SCIENCE 286, 288 (2003). 
 62. See, e.g., Kara Dolinski & Olga G. Troyanskaya, Implications of Big Data for Cell 
Biology, 26 MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 2575, 2575–76 (2015) (discussing big 
data and its implications in biological research); see also Peter Tormay, Big Data in 
Pharmaceutical R&D: Creating a Sustainable R&D Engine, 29 PHARMACEUTICAL MED. 
87, 87, 91 (2015) (discussing opportunities that “Big Data” offers for improving 
productivity of pharmaceutical R&D and need for pre-competitive collaboration to utilize 
these opportunities). 
 63. See, e.g., Christopher J. Welch, Joel M. Hawkins & Jean Tom, Precompetitive 
Collaboration on Enabling Technologies for the Pharmaceutical Industry, 18 ORGANIC 
PROCESS RES. DEV. 481, 482 (2014). 
 64. See, e.g., id. 
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One of the most dominant themes in FDA and NIH descriptions 
of pre-competitive collaboration is the idea that research data and 
other results that are publicly shared will broadly benefit the industry. 
This mindset, with its focus on rules for governing public access, likely 
finds its roots in the HGP’s aggressive data release programs65 and 
continues in current NIH policies on genomic data release.66 Today, 
an emphasis on public access to research results pervades much of the 
reasoning offered by U.S. biomedical research agencies regarding 
pre-competitive collaboration. For example, Dr. Francis Collins 
describes the AMP as a pre-competitive partnership characterized by 
combined public and private sector efforts to identify promising 
therapeutic targets and to openly share these findings with the 
public.67 Janet Woodcock, the director of the FDA Center for Drug 
Evaluation and Research emphasizes the importance of making 
research results publicly available.68 She explains, “In contrast to the 
guarded nature of commercial scientific findings, the results of 
precompetitive research are meant to be made publicly available, 
subjected to scientific scrutiny, and contribute to knowledge that 
improves the prospects for invention-based competition	.	.	.	.”69 She is 
careful, however, to distinguish between research that provides 
generally applicable tools and techniques and results that are focused 
on the development of a specific product.70 
The nature of the participants also influences the perception of a 
collaboration as being pre-competitive. Many collaborations 
described as pre-competitive involve some form of university or 
governmental involvement.71 Academic participants in collaborations 
may harbor different understandings of what pre-competitive means, 
 
 65. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 66. See, e.g., Final NIH Genomic Data Sharing Policy, 79 Fed. Reg. 51,345, 51,352 
(Aug. 28, 2014) (“[B]asic sequence data and certain related information (e.g., genotypes, 
haplotypes, p-values, allele frequencies) are precompetitive. Such data made available 
through NIH-designated data repositories, and all conclusions derived directly from them, 
should remain freely available without any licensing requirements.”). 
 67. See infra Section I.C.3; see also Driving Innovation Through Federal Investments, 
Hearing Before the S. Appropriations Comm., 113th Cong. 7 (2014), http://www
.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/hearings/NIH%20written%20testimony%20for
%204%2029%20SAC%20Hearing%20FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/UQ3C-FEAZ] 
(testimony of Francis S. Collins, Director, National Institutes of Health). 
 68. See Woodcock, supra note 22, at 521. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. (“Precompetitive research is a subset of translational research that is 
focused on improving the tools and techniques needed for successful translation, and not 
on development of a specific product.”). 
 71. See, e.g., IOM 2011 REPORT, supra note 9, at 16–17. 
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but to outsiders much academic research activity would likely be 
considered pre-competitive.72 
In addition to variations in characterizing the defining features of 
pre-competitive collaborations, there has been a trend toward more 
expansive views of what is considered pre-competitive.73 As interest 
in pre-competitive collaborations has grown among both public and 
private stakeholders, so too has a willingness to conceptualize pre-
competition in broader terms, as “pre-competitive spaces” that can be 
created through collaboration. In the medical device context, such 
pre-competitive spaces have been referred to by the FDA as “[a]reas 
of research and development that possess common aspects across an 
industry segment not tied to a proprietary device.”74 According to one 
Pfizer executive, “[t]he basic biology, the understanding of disease, 
biomarkers of prognosis, and even drug responses all can be areas of 
pre-competitive R&D.”75 He goes on to explain that areas that Pfizer 
may currently consider to be competitive could eventually become 
areas of pre-competitive R&D.76 
This evolution in thinking treats the contours of pre-competition 
as an industry choice rather than an objective standard. As described 
by several industry experts, “Consortia offer unique opportunities for 
stakeholders to redefine the precompetitive space, develop new work 
streams and jointly produce tools and resources.”77 Others have urged 
a “reboot” of the pharmaceutical industry by “extending the notion of 
‘precompetitive’ collaboration to encompass later stages of research 
to allow [public-private partnerships] to flourish.”78 One ambitious 
initiative called Arch2POCM imagined a world of drug discovery and 
development in which all R&D work up to and including Phase II 
clinical trials would be considered pre-competitive.79 Removing data 
access and intellectual property restrictions from essential parts of the 
 
 72. See, e.g., id. Note the chapter title “Requisites for Successful Pre-competitive 
Collaboration—Requisites from Academia” suggests that the term “pre-competitive” may 
have a different meaning in academia than it does in industry. See id. at 13. 
 73. See, e.g., id. at 3. 
 74. See, e.g., James Coburn, Digital Library of Modeling and Simulation: Who, What, 
When, Where, How 4 (June 11, 2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices
/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/UCM358859.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RXC-84L4]. 
 75. IOM 2011 REPORT, supra note 9, at 13–14. 
 76. See id. at 14. 
 77. Mittleman et al., supra note 23, at 980. 
 78. Elkins et al., supra note 6, at 268. 
 79. See, e.g., Chris Cain, Making the Case for Precompetitive Clinical Development, 4 
SCIBX 1, 1 (2011). 
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Arch2POCM plan would create a broad pre-competitive environment 
for drug discovery and development.80 
C. Three Examples of Pre-Competitive Collaboration 
Early successes with pre-competitive collaborations have fueled 
efforts to expand the number of pre-competitive collaborations81 and 
to expand the boundaries of pre-competitive spaces.82 New industry-
driven pre-competitive initiatives continue to emerge in a wide range 
of areas, all the way from developing improved mouse models of 
disease to sharing data about adverse reactions to approved drugs.83 
This Section provides three detailed examples of biopharma pre-
competitive collaborations that draw increasingly closer to the 
product commercialization path: (1) TSC, a collaboration focused on 
early-stage scientific research; (2) iSAEC, an industry effort to 
identify genetic markers for serious adverse reactions to approved 
drugs; and (3) the AMP, a pharmaceutical collaboration to identify 
drug targets for four identified disease categories. These examples 
illustrate the ways in which industry participants have thought about 
and organized pre-competitive activities at different stages along the 
biopharma R&D life cycle. 
1.  Early-Stage Scientific Research: The SNP Consortium 
The SNP Consortium, or TSC, is one of the earliest examples of 
the use of pre-competitive collaboration strategies in the biopharma 
industry. Single nucleotide polymorphisms (“SNPs”) are single base 
pair variations in the human genome that occur on average once 
every 300–1,000 nucleotides.84 They are the most common form of 
human genetic variation, serving as milestones or markers across the 
human genome.85 TSC was established in 1999 as a two-year, $45 
million initiative funded by a group of leading pharmaceutical and 
information technology firms and the Wellcome Trust to build a high-
 
 80. Id. 
 81. See, e.g., Mittleman et al., supra note 23, at 980 (arguing for the need for more 
pre-competitive collaborations). 
 82. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 79, at 2. 
 83. See, e.g., Chris Cain, A Mind for Precompetitive Collaboration, 19 SCIBX 1, 1 
(2012) (examining increase in pre-competitive consortia backed by industry). 
 84. See, e.g., NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, HELP ME UNDERSTAND GENETICS 208 
(2016); see also Arthur L. Holden, The SNP Consortium: Summary of a Private 
Consortium Effort to Develop an Applied Map of the Human Genome, 32 
BIOTECHNIQUES (SUPP.) S22, S22 (2002). 
 85. See, e.g., NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, supra note 84, at 208. 
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density map of SNPs along the human genome.86 The project was 
motivated by the hope that these SNPs could later be used to help 
identify genetic differences associated with disease and individual 
variations in treatment.87 
TSC built upon and complemented the work being done by the 
HGP. Its initial goal was to identify up to 300,000 SNPs throughout 
the human genome and to map at least half of these.88 An 
unexpectedly large influx of genomic data from the HGP enabled 
TSC to exceed its original goals, and by 2001 researchers had 
cataloged the locations of 1.4 million SNPs along the human 
genome.89 As SNPs were identified, they were validated, mapped, and 
deposited in publicly available databases maintained by the 
consortium and NIH’s National Center for Biotechnology 
Information.90 TSC made the data publicly available with no early 
access by participating firms.91 
In contrast to the HGP, which was largely government funded 
and government driven, TSC was a private sector initiative. Its 
backers were comprised of ten of the world’s largest pharmaceutical 
firms, two large information technology firms, and the Wellcome 
Trust, one of the world’s largest medical research charities.92 It was 
financed through member contributions, with each member required 
to provide financial support and contribute to the collaborative 
management of the project.93 Membership was open, but interested 
parties were required to provide the required financial and non-
 
 86. John Hodgson, Analysts, Firms Pour Cold Water on SNP Consortium, 17 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 526, 526 (1999). 
 87. See Human Genome Project and SNP Consortium Announce Collaboration to 
Identify New Genetic Markers for Disease, NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RES. INST. (July 
2000), http://www.genome.gov/10001456 [https://perma.cc/SFE7-5KU2]. 
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financial resources in order to become members.94 The ten 
pharmaceutical companies who were part of the founding group were 
each reported to have contributed $3 million to TSC’s budget.95 TSC 
was overseen by a board of directors comprised of one member from 
each dues-paying member organization.96 The CEO and chairman of 
TSC was independent of any member organization and the sole 
employee of the consortium.97 
The founders’ underlying motivation behind TSC was to 
accelerate the discovery and publication of SNP data in order to 
ensure that it remained accessible to researchers and the industry free 
from patent encumbrances.98 TSC adopted a multi-prong approach to 
ensure that the SNP data it discovered would not be patented.99 First, 
it contractually prohibited the academic researchers performing SNP 
discovery and mapping activity from seeking patent protection on 
their discoveries.100 Second, it released all SNP data it discovered to 
public databases, thus creating voluminous prior art.101 Finally, it 
adopted a novel “protective” patenting strategy in which it filed 
patent applications disclosing all newly identified and mapped SNPs 
with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) in order to enter 
this data into the PTO prior art database and to establish clear 
priority dates to defeat later patent applications.102 These patent 
applications were later converted into Statutory Invention 
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Registrations (“SIRs”) or, following the 1999 Patent Act amendments 
providing for the publication of patent applications after eighteen 
months,103 abandoned.104 None of the TSC applications were 
prosecuted to issuance, but instead TSC utilized the PTO publication 
system to deter independent patenting of the discovered SNPs.105 
Despite this program of patent deterrence with respect to the 
basic SNP data and map generated by TSC, the consortium made it 
clear that TSC participants were free to pursue patents based on 
discoveries made using SNPs.106 Thus, the SNP map created by TSC 
was intended to act as a public research tool, but not to prevent 
patenting of downstream diagnostics or therapeutics developed by 
TSC participants or by others. 
Given the participation of private firms representing a large 
share of the worldwide pharmaceutical market, TSC was careful from 
the outset to implement policies and practices designed to reduce the 
risk of antitrust liability. It filed public notices of its membership 
under the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1984 
(“NCRPA”) with the attorney general and the FTC, entitling it to 
certain immunities from enhanced antitrust damages.107 It also 
adopted an antitrust compliance policy prohibiting its members from 
exchanging competitive information in connection with any TSC 
activity and otherwise from engaging in anticompetitive or collusive 
behavior under the auspices of TSC.108 
While taking these natural steps to preempt antitrust concern 
about a consortium of competitors sharing information, TSC also 
relied on its characterization as a pre-competitive collaboration to 
ameliorate antitrust concerns.109 Consortium members that were 
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industry competitors treated the SNP map as a pre-competitive 
research tool, with open access to the data produced guaranteed from 
the outset.110 
TSC has been cited as a leading example of early-stage pre-
competitive collaboration directed at the development of basic 
research tools and scientific data.111 It also provided a model for 
subsequent pre-competitive collaborations, such as iSAEC, to build 
upon.112 
2.  Taking the Model Downstream: The International Serious 
Adverse Events Consortium  
Between 1976 and 2007 twenty-eight drugs were withdrawn from 
the U.S. market for safety reasons, including the occurrence of serious 
adverse events (“SAEs”) that were not fully appreciated during 
clinical trials.113 SAEs of some pharmaceutical products have included 
birth defects, liver damage, serious skin rash, kidney and renal injury, 
cardiac irregularity, and psychological effects. While some SAEs may 
be predictable based on the properties of a drug, many may instead 
be idiosyncratic, with predisposing genotypes.114 Identifying genetic 
risk factors for SAEs would therefore have significant benefits for 
patient care, pharmaceutical developers, and drug safety regulators.115 
For these reasons, drug safety has become a high priority for the 
FDA.116 
Nevertheless, historically it has been difficult to study SAEs in 
the field. Cases are relatively rare, occur sporadically around the 
world, are often undiagnosed or misdiagnosed by clinicians to whom 
symptoms are presented, are not classified or reported in a uniform 
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manner, and may be caused by a number of different but chemically 
related pharmaceutical products.117 Collecting adequate numbers of 
cases and DNA samples from affected patients, and analyzing and 
determining the genetic factors that may underlie SAEs, requires a 
level of cross-industry collaboration hitherto unseen in the biopharma 
industry.118 
The impetus for the international Serious Adverse Events 
Consortium, or iSAEC, arose from recognition by the FDA and 
industry that collaboration was essential to determine whether a 
genetic basis existed for certain drug-induced SAEs.119 Drug safety 
assessment was seen by industry stakeholders as “a major area of pre-
competitive research	.	.	.	since the development of new approaches to 
predict potential side effects is of paramount importance to reduce 
late-stage drug failures, a shared concern for patients, industry and 
regulatory authorities alike.”120 
iSAEC is a non-profit corporation formed in 2007 with the goal 
of identifying genetic variants useful in understanding the risk of 
drug-related SAEs.121 iSAEC was launched with the financial and 
scientific support of six pharmaceutical firms.122 Three more 
pharmaceutical firms and the Wellcome Trust were added after the 
consortium concluded a preliminary research program.123 Three 
associate but non-dues-paying and non-voting members also joined 
following this initial research phase.124 The FDA is actively involved 
in the consortium as an observer, advisor, and collaborator but does 
not have formal membership status.125 iSAEC membership now 
includes nine of the largest U.S., European, and Japanese 
pharmaceutical firms; two large information technology providers; a 
U.S. hospital network; and the Wellcome Trust.126 It remains privately 
funded by its members, who are either voting or non-voting 
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depending on the nature of their contributions.127 The board of 
directors includes one representative from each voting member, plus 
an independent chairman and CEO.128 
Like TSC, iSAEC has made antitrust filings under the NCRPA 
and has adopted an antitrust compliance policy prohibiting the 
exchange of competitive information by its members and 
implementing other measures to reduce the risk and appearance of 
improper collusion.129 All board meetings are conducted with the 
involvement of legal counsel.130 
iSAEC commits to making its research results available to the 
public and free of any patent encumbrances using a defensive 
patenting strategy based on that of TSC.131 Both members and 
collaborators are contractually prohibited from patenting the genetic 
associations and related discoveries made with iSAEC support, 
although they are not prevented from patenting downstream 
discoveries enabled by these findings.132 To ensure that its results 
remain in the public domain, iSAEC files U.S. patent applications on 
DNA markers identified in its studies with the intention of 
abandoning them after publication.133 Users of iSAEC data “must 
agree not to seek patents claiming any DNA markers or [genetic] 
associations disclosed in, or derived from, the iSAEC data” or any 
patents that “would otherwise block access to, or use of, [this] 
data.”134 This agreement to preserve the public nature of the results 
produced by iSAEC is seen as important in alleviating antitrust 
concerns that might otherwise arise from coordination among a group 
of competitors.135 
Like TSC, iSAEC has helped to develop and refine a model of 
pre-competitive collaboration that entails open use research practices 
and standards and accompanying limitations on intellectual property 
restrictions. These data sharing and patent limitation requirements 
 
 127. See Holden et al., supra note 54, at 795. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Int’l Severe Adverse Events Consortium, Antitrust Policy (amended Feb. 28, 
2008) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). 
 130. Author Jorge Contreras serves as legal counsel for iSAEC. 
 131. See supra Section I.C.1. 
 132. See Jorge L. Contreras, Aris Floratos & Arthur L. Holden, The International 
Serious Adverse Events Consortium’s Data Sharing Model, 31 NATURE BIOTECH. 17, 18 
(2013) (discussing IP strategy and policies of iSAEC). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See id. at 17–18 (“This public commitment of IP serves as a cornerstone of 
iSAEC’s charitable tax-exempt status and also alleviates concerns regarding potential 
antitrust challenges to this coordinated research activity.”). 
95 N.C. L. REV. 67 (2016) 
92 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
emphasize the “public goods” focus of the collaborations. The 
consortium is proposed as a useful reference point for other public-
private consortia “seeking to facilitate pre-competitive research.”136 
3.  Expanding the Boundaries of Pre-Competition: The Accelerating 
Medicines Partnership 
The creation of the Accelerating Medicines Partnership, or 
AMP, marked an ambitious effort by the NIH, the FDA, and some of 
the world’s largest pharmaceutical firms to push collaborative efforts 
downstream into areas of drug discovery and development that were 
formerly highly secretive and competitive.137 When AMP was first 
launched it was heralded as “the first national cross-sector 
partnership of its size and scale” and “the latest initiative in the drug 
development market to embrace open data exchange, encouraging 
collaboration over competition as pathways for promoting 
innovation.”138 
AMP was formed in February 2014 as a public-private 
partnership among the NIH, the FDA, ten biopharma firms, and 
multiple disease advocacy groups and disease research foundations.139 
The mission of AMP, and the hope of its NIH advocates, is to provide 
a new model for drug discovery and development that involves 
collaborating in the identification and validation of promising 
biological targets of disease.140 It is promoted as a “precompetitive 
collaboration [that] harnesses collective capabilities, scale, and 
resources across multiple sectors to improve the therapeutic 
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development efforts for complex, heterogeneous diseases.”141 AMP is 
focusing initially on three disease areas that share attributes of 
complexity, high risk, high cost, significant amounts of data, a track 
record of failed industry efforts, and significant public need for 
therapies.142 These characteristics create fertile ground for new 
collaborative models. 
AMP takes the form of a five-year agreement among ten large 
pharmaceutical firms, the NIH, and a number of disease-based 
foundations to collaborate in identifying promising drug and 
diagnostic targets to treat four diseases—Alzheimer’s, type 2 
diabetes, rheumatoid arthritis, and lupus.143 The collaboration is 
managed by the Foundation for the NIH, an independent tax-exempt 
organization.144 Funding for the initiative is shared fairly equally 
between public and private participants, with the NIH providing 
$121.5 million over five years, the ten pharmaceutical firms providing 
$110.6 million and patient advocacy groups providing $1.6 million.145 
Participants are expected to pool not just funds, but also expertise, 
data, and other resources.146 AMP is structured as an umbrella 
partnership for the three initial programs focusing on separate disease 
areas.147 Each program has its own budget, its own steering committee 
comprised of representatives from the NIH, the FDA, participating 
industry members and patient advocacy organizations, and its own set 
of milestones.148 The steering committees are governed by the AMP 
executive committee, which again includes representatives from the 
NIH, the FDA, participating industry members, and patient advocacy 
organizations.149 
The AMP arrangement took more than two years of intense 
negotiations to conclude, and it ultimately focuses on areas that are 
both of significant public health concern and in which pharmaceutical 
firms have struggled in their individual discovery and development 
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efforts.150 Each disease area has its own pilot program lasting between 
three and five years, complete with a research plan and set of 
milestones designed to characterize biomarkers of disease and disease 
progression and to identify biological targets most likely to respond to 
new therapies.151 The pilot project for Alzheimer’s disease received 
the bulk of the AMP funding.152 This project involves searching for 
new biomarkers for disease progression through four NIH-funded 
clinical trials designed to test ways to delay or prevent disease 
onset.153 The project also includes analysis of shared brain tissue 
samples from Alzheimer’s patients to validate jointly identified 
biological targets, develop new models of late-onset Alzheimer’s 
disease, and screen compounds provided by collaborators against 
novel disease targets.154 
The type 2 diabetes project will collect and pool genetic and 
clinical data on patients provided by collaborators or developed 
through project studies with the goal of finding and validating 
promising molecules and pathways as targets for therapeutic 
development.155 The NIH National Institute of Diabetes and 
Digestive and Kidney Diseases (“NIDDK”) will provide “a website 
that will function as a ‘smart PubMed’, gathering all of the genetic 
and patient data from ongoing and completed trials.”156 The third 
pilot, focusing on rheumatoid arthritis and lupus, will analyze single 
cells from newly collected tissue and blood samples to better 
understand the diseases and aid in the search for new drug targets.157 
 
 150. Industry and Non-Profits Join Forces to Speed Validation of Disease Targets, 
NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.nih.gov/news/health/feb2014/od-
04.htm [https://perma.cc/5PD5-N3SP]. 
 151. See Jocelyn Kaiser, NIH, 10 Drug Companies Partner to Study Four Diseases, 
SCIENCE (Feb. 4, 2014, 3:45 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2014/02/nih-10-drug-
companies-partner-study-four-diseases [https://perma.cc/ZDM8-AYBL]. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See Accelerating Medicines Partnership: Type 2 Diabetes, NAT’L INSTS. OF 
HEALTH, http://www.nih.gov/research-training/accelerating-medicines-partnership-amp/type
-2-diabetes#approach [https://perma.cc/J2ZP-HUM6]. 
 156. See, e.g., Sara Reardon, Pharma Firms Join NIH on Drug Development, NATURE 
(Feb. 4, 2014) http://www.nature.com/news/pharma-firms-join-nih-on-drug-development-
1.14672 [https://perma.cc/3WBU-F394]. 
 157. See Accelerating Medicines Partnership: Autoimmune Diseases of Rheumatoid 
Arthritis and Lupus, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, http://www.nih.gov/research-training
/accelerating-medicines-partnership-amp/autoimmune-diseases-rheumatoid-arthritis-lupus 
[https://perma.cc/CG95-LYVM] (“The partnership will integrate several new or 
developing technologies to analyze single cells and groups of cells involved in 
autoimmunity in new ways; collect tissue samples, including synovium (the tissue that lines 
joints) from people with RA and lupus for molecular analysis; develop computational 
95 N.C. L. REV. 67 (2016) 
2016] PRE-COMPETITION 95 
All of these projects include agreements among the collaborators 
to contribute financial support and scientists who are experts on the 
relevant disease, share research data and tissue and blood samples 
with each other and with the public.158 The goal of the project is for 
the collaborators to gain a better understanding of how each disease 
works through their collaborative efforts and data sharing, to use this 
knowledge to identify biological targets that can be attacked with 
potential drugs, and to measure how diseases progress and respond to 
treatments.159 
AMP has been characterized as pre-competitive both by 
reference to the type of data that is being shared and by the public 
nature of its results. The NIH has promoted AMP as an arrangement 
that should not face antitrust concerns because it involves early, pre-
competitive research and the results will be made freely available.160 
Participants are pooling large quantities of data and engaging in joint 
analysis of this data to identify useful biological markers and drug 
targets.161 The data that is being shared is described as data that does 
not, on its own, convey any competitive advantage for the 
participating firms.162 Instead, the parties must work together to 
identify useful targets from within this aggregation of data, thus 
increasing the odds that they are all picking the right drug targets to 
pursue in subsequent private drug development projects.163 
The AMP participants are contractually obligated to make all of 
the data and methods from the early-stage clinical trials that are 
conducted jointly by collaborators in AMP freely available. Only 
after the information is published are participants permitted to use 
the information in their own proprietary drug programs. As the 
projects progress, it is anticipated that participants will shift into 
product development activities that are more competitive. The details 
of AMP agreements are confidential, but reports suggest that 
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participants may obtain proprietary rights over drug candidates and 
otherwise stake out proprietary positions in downstream areas of 
interest.164 
AMP provides an important example of a prominent 
pharmaceutical industry collaboration that has stretched the 
definition of “pre-competitive” activity far beyond early conceptions 
of basic scientific research. As NIH Director Dr. Francis Collins 
describes it, “We’re going to increase the odds of picking the right 
[drug and diagnostic targets] at the very beginning and avoid wasting 
time and money chasing duds,” but once the information from the 
early-stage trials is published, “the full competitive power of [the] 
pharmaceutical industry can kick in.”165 Inherent in this approach is 
the idea that participants can redefine the innovation process to 
broaden the areas in which the process is cooperative and narrow the 
areas in which the process is competitive. AMP is portrayed as 
complementary to the competitive drug development process, 
facilitating competition in those areas where it will be most 
meaningful. 
These examples illustrate the progression of pre-competitive 
collaborations in the biopharma industry. While various private and 
public policy rationales have been offered in support of pre-
competitive collaborations, what remains unclear is the degree to 
which antitrust law has been taken into account in pre-competitive 
collaborations’ structuring and implementation—at least beyond 
efforts to characterize the collaborations as pre-competitive. 
II.  THE ANTITRUST FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING INDUSTRY 
COLLABORATIONS 
As the analysis above suggests, there appears to be a prevailing 
intuition among governmental agencies and private sector 
participants that pre-competitive collaborations are, by their nature, 
procompetitive. While it may indeed be true that many pre-
competitive collaborations in the biopharma sector offer substantial 
procompetitive benefits, it is not necessarily the case that all do. 
Rather, each such pre-competitive collaboration must be analyzed 
under the existing antitrust law framework that has been established 
by statute, case law, and guidance from enforcement agencies. Part II 
summarizes the antitrust framework for analyzing collaborations 
among competitors. It begins with the general antitrust framework as 
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applied to agreements in restraint of trade and then focuses on the 
more specialized guidelines and approaches that have been developed 
by antitrust authorities to deal with the unique challenges posed by 
R&D collaborations and R&D markets. 
A. Standard Framework Governing Agreements in Restraint of 
Trade: Sherman Act Section 1 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits any “contract, 
combination	.	.	.	or conspiracy, in restraint of trade.”166 Key to the 
existence of a violation of section 1 is the existence of concerted 
action among two or more firms: an “agreement” in restraint of 
trade.167 In addition, in order to be condemned, such an agreement 
must be “unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions.”168 
Finally, as with most antitrust offenses, the parties to such an 
agreement must possess sufficient power to distort competitive 
processes in one or more markets, otherwise known as “market 
power.”169 The prohibition against anticompetitive agreements under 
section 1 applies both to agreements among firms at the same level in 
the supply chain (i.e., agreements among competitors, or “horizontal” 
agreements) as well as to agreements among firms at different levels 
of the supply chain (i.e., agreements among suppliers and distributors, 
or “vertical” agreements).170 
Any agreement having potentially anticompetitive effects would 
be analyzed under section 1 using a framework developed by the 
courts over the last century. This framework is also employed by the 
principal antitrust enforcement agencies, the DOJ Antitrust Division 
and the FTC, in assessing whether or not to bring an antitrust 
enforcement action in a particular case. 
The first step in the antitrust analysis of any agreement is 
determining whether it should be deemed illegal per se, or whether it 
should be analyzed under the so-called “rule of reason.” Illegality per 
 
 166. 15 U.S.C. §	1 (2012). 
 167. See 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION, ¶	1400, at 3 (3d ed. 
2010). 
 168. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911). 
 169. See 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & JOHN L. SOLOW, 
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION, 
¶	500, at 107 (4th ed. 2014); LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW 
OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 187 (2d ed. 2006) (acknowledging 
“[p]ower and the potential for or actual abuse of that power is the common thread running 
through the fabric of antitrust law”). 
 170. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 167, ¶	1402, at 11–20. 
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se is generally reserved for agreements “whose nature and necessary 
effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the 
industry is needed to establish their illegality.”171 Agreements of a 
type that “always or almost always tend to raise prices or reduce 
output” are generally deemed to be illegal per se.172 Traditionally, 
such agreements have been directed to price fixing, reducing output, 
allocating markets, group boycotts, and tying arrangements.173 While 
these activities are still viewed with suspicion, the analysis of illegality 
per se has, in recent years, become less mechanistic, and courts have 
proven increasingly willing to consider the potential ameliorating 
effects of arrangements that might otherwise have been condemned 
as per se violations.174 
Agreements that are not deemed to be illegal per se are 
evaluated under the more flexible rule of reason approach. The rule 
of reason is applied to agreements “whose competitive effect can only 
be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, the 
history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed.”175 Under 
the rule of reason, if a challenged arrangement is found, after all of 
the circumstances have been weighed, to “impos[e] an unreasonable 
restraint on competition,” it will be deemed illegal.176 
As formulated by the Supreme Court and U.S. enforcement 
agencies, the central question in a rule of reason analysis is “whether 
the relevant agreement likely harms competition by increasing the 
ability or incentive profitably to raise price above or reduce output, 
quality, service, or innovation below what likely would prevail in the 
absence of the relevant agreement.”177 Factors that are considered in 
assessing whether or not an agreement imposes an unreasonable 
restraint on competition include “specific information about the 
relevant business, its condition before and after the restraint was 
imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.”178 This 
 
 171. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). 
 172. COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 19, §	3.2, at 8 (2000). 
 173. N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
 174. See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 
468 U.S. 85, 100–01 (1984) (holding that a collective agreement to limit output (number of 
collegiate athletic events broadcast on television) should be analyzed under the rule of 
reason because the agreement was arguably necessary for any product to be available at 
all); see also 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 167, ¶	1509, at 441; SULLIVAN & 
GRIMES, supra note 169, at 243–60. 
 175. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 692. 
 176. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885–86 
(2007); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). 
 177. COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 19, §	3.1, at 7. 
 178. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). 
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analysis, as conducted by the agencies with respect to horizontal 
agreements, often includes one or more of several considerations: 
(a)	intent of the parties, (b)	limitations on independence and 
competition, (c)	exchange of information, (d)	duration, (e)	markets 
and market power, and (f)	offsetting procompetitive benefits. 
While anticompetitive intent alone does not constitute a 
violation of the antitrust laws, the intent of the parties in entering into 
an agreement is relevant in assessing its likely competitive effects.179 
Thus, if evidence of a manifestly anticompetitive intent exists with 
regard to the formation of an arrangement among competitors, it is 
more likely than not that anticompetitive effects will follow.180 But, by 
the same token, evidence of procompetitive intentions will not 
necessarily negate the anticompetitive impact of an arrangement 
among competitors.181 
A second factor is the extent to which agreements impose 
limitations on independence and competition among the parties. 
Agreements that limit the parties’ independent decision making or 
combine control over their production, pricing, assets, or other 
competitive factors tend to reduce their incentive or ability to 
compete independently, and may thus harm competition.182 Some 
agreements expressly or implicitly limit the parties’ ability to compete 
in certain markets.183 The degree to which independent competition is 
eliminated through an agreement has a direct bearing on its 
anticompetitive effect. 
The nature and extent of information exchange is a third factor. 
The exchange of information is often necessary to achieve the 
legitimate purposes of a collaborative business arrangement. 
However, when competitively sensitive information such as pricing, 
output, customers, and business plans is shared by competitors, 
collusion may be facilitated, prices fixed, and competition reduced.184 
As noted by the agencies, “The competitive concern depends on the 
 
 179. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see also 
COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 19, §	3.31, at 12. 
 180. See Richard S. Wirtz, Purpose and Effect in Sherman Act Conspiracies, 57 WASH. 
L. REV. 1, 24 (1981) (noting “[p]urpose is arguably the only reliable guide to the 
agreement’s effects. When the record shows that the parties sought to injure 
competition	.	.	.	it is right to shift the burden of proof to the party who denies that such 
effects will follow”). 
 181. Bd. of Trade of Chi., 246 U.S. at 238. 
 182. COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 19, §	3.31, at 12. 
 183. Id. §	3.34(a), at 19. 
 184. Id. §	3.31(b), at 15; see also SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 169, at 260–70 
(outlining historical development of information exchange cases). 
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nature of the information shared.”185 Often, structural features of an 
arrangement will offer clues regarding the likelihood that competitive 
information will be exchanged among the parties, and safeguards can 
be implemented to reduce the likelihood of such exchanges. For 
example, if the parties agree not to assign marketing personnel to 
participate on committees in an R&D collaboration, then competitive 
information is less likely to be exchanged.186 Likewise, competitive 
information from the parties can be consolidated by independent 
third parties who will then utilize it to advance the collaboration’s 
goals.187 
Fourth, the duration of an agreement among competitors will 
have a bearing on its anticompetitive effect. On balance, short-term 
agreements are more likely than long-term agreements to result in the 
parties’ competition, both within and outside the field of 
collaboration.188 When the duration of a horizontal agreement 
exceeds ten years, the agencies are likely to treat the arrangement as 
a merger.189 
The fifth factor, market power, plays an important role in the 
analysis. In order for an agreement to be condemned under the 
antitrust laws, the parties must possess sufficient power to distort 
competitive processes in one or more markets, otherwise known as 
“market power.”190 Market power is often measured by “the ability to 
raise price profitably by restricting output.”191 For an agreement to be 
condemned under the rule of reason, the parties must be shown both 
to have restrained competition in a defined product and geographic 
market, and to have played a “significant role in that market.”192  
 
 185. COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 19, §	3.31(b), at 15–16 (noting current 
information is more concerning than historical information, company-specific information 
is more concerning than aggregated information). 
 186. See id. §	3.34(e), at 21. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. §	3.34(f), at 21. 
 189. Id. §	1.3, at 4–5 & n.10. Under the agencies’ joint Guidelines for Horizontal 
Mergers, the central question for analysis is whether or not a merger between actual or 
potential competitors may substantially lessen competition. See FED. TRADE COMM’N & 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDELINES FOR HORIZONTAL MERGERS 1–2 (2010). This 
assessment is made under the assumption that “mergers should not be permitted to create, 
enhance, or entrench market power or to facilitate its exercise.” Id. at 2. 
 190. See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 169, ¶	500, at 107. Note that market definition 
and the concept of market power are relevant not only to section 1 concerted conduct 
claims, but also to claims of monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§	2 (2012), and to mergers under section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §	18 (2012). Much 
of the literature and analysis concerning market definition arises in the merger context. 
 191. AREEDA ET AL., supra note 169, ¶	501, at 109. 
 192. 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 167, ¶	1503, at 397. 
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The definition of product and geographic markets is complex, 
fact-intensive, and draws heavily on economic analysis.193 Some of the 
principal factors evaluated when defining a product market are the 
degree to which different products can function as substitutes for one 
another, the degree of price elasticity among different products, and 
the degree to which producers can easily shift from production of one 
product to another.194 Geographic markets are defined based on the 
ability of suppliers to sell beyond their immediate locations, taking 
into account factors such as transportation costs, buyer convenience, 
and customer preferences.195 This being said, a full-scale economic 
analysis of relevant markets is not necessarily required if proof of 
actual anticompetitive harm can be shown.196 
Once the relevant markets affected by an agreement are defined, 
the rule of reason analysis turns to the share of these markets 
controlled by the parties and whether the parties possess sufficient 
power to adversely affect competition in those markets.197 The 
determination of market power involves a fact-specific economic 
analysis that considers factors such as: (1) the share of the market 
enjoyed by each party and the parties collectively; (2) concentration 
of the market; (3) the parties’ ability to extract high profit margins; 
(4) barriers to market entry; (5) control over intellectual property; 
and (6) behavioral indicators.198 If the collective market shares of the 
parties to a horizontal arrangement are sufficiently small, then it may 
be presumed that their arrangement, regardless of its other features, 
is unlikely to harm competition in the market.199 
With these factors in mind, the balancing analysis focuses on any 
offsetting procompetitive benefits from the arrangements. In the rule 
of reason analysis, the above considerations are analyzed to 
determine whether an agreement has, or is likely to have, 
anticompetitive effects. If so, then these must be weighed against the 
 
 193. See generally AREEDA ET AL., supra note 169, pt. 2, ch. 5, at 107–472 (discussing 
market structure issues, specifically market power and market definition). 
 194. See id. ¶¶	561–63, at 378–418. 
 195. See id. ¶¶	552–53, at 344–65. 
 196. See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460–61 (1986). 
 197. See, e.g., E. Food Servs., Inv. v. Pontifical Catholic Univ. Servs. Ass’n, 357 F.3d 1, 
5 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 198. See generally AREEDA ET AL., supra note 169, pt. 2, ch. 5, at 107–234 (discussing 
defining market power and alternative non-market-based proofs of market power). See 
also SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 169, at 62–74. 
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agreement’s likely procompetitive benefits. Procompetitive benefits 
exist when an arrangement is likely to benefit consumers through 
lower prices, higher quality, or more rapid product introductions.200 If 
the procompetitive benefits of an agreement outweigh its 
anticompetitive harm, then the agreement will survive rule of reason 
review. 
B. Antitrust Analysis of R&D Collaborations 
As discussed in Section II.A above, agreements in restraint of 
trade are prohibited under section 1 of the Sherman Act. This Section 
applies the general antitrust analysis under section 1 specifically to 
R&D collaborations. Collaborative research agreements,201 which 
often involve concerted action by competitors (e.g., different 
pharmaceutical producers) and parties at different levels of the supply 
chain (e.g., universities, pharmaceutical producers, biotechnology 
firms, and healthcare providers), can involve both horizontal and 
vertical restraints that can give rise to antitrust concern. Some 
collaborations may serve as “little more than fronts for cartels” with 
no lawful purpose, and others may integrate the participants’ 
businesses so completely that they are effectively mergers requiring 
enhanced antitrust scrutiny.202 
However, legitimate collaborative R&D agreements have long 
been recognized by courts and antitrust enforcement agencies as 
offering significant procompetitive benefits. These agreements have 
the potential to spread the financial burden of costly research, to 
combine technical skill and knowledge to promote greater innovation, 
to accelerate the development of new products, and to lower research 
and production costs through economies of scale, thereby increasing 
overall social welfare.203 Collaborations that set out to achieve such 
goals “often are not only benign but procompetitive.”204 Accordingly, 
collaborative agreements are typically reviewed under the rule of 
reason.205 
 
 200. See id. §	2.1, at 6. 
 201. Collaborative arrangements are also often referred to in the literature as “joint 
ventures.” 
 202. 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 167, ¶	1478a, at 341–42. 
 203. See 13 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 167, ¶	2115a, at 111–12; 
COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 19, pmbl., at 1. 
 204. COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 19, pmbl., at 1. 
 205. See Christine A. Varney, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Antitrust Immunities, Remarks Prepared for the American Antitrust Institute’s 
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1.  Joint Ventures and the National Cooperative Research and 
Production Act  
In response to industry concerns during the early 1980s that 
aggressive antitrust enforcement could chill productive joint research 
ventures,206 Congress enacted the National Cooperative Research and 
Production Act, or the NCRPA.207 The NCRPA limits potential 
antitrust liability for horizontal arrangements among competitors that 
qualify as “joint ventures.”208 It also establishes that such 
collaborations “shall not be deemed illegal, per se,” but will be 
assessed using a “reasonableness” standard.209 
For purposes of the NCRPA, a “joint venture” constitutes any 
group of activities undertaken by two or more parties for the purpose 
of 
(A) theoretical analysis, experimentation, or systematic study 
of phenomena or observable facts, (B) the development or 
testing of basic engineering techniques, (C) the extension of 
investigative findings or theory of a scientific or technical 
nature into practical application for experimental and 
demonstration purposes, including the experimental production 
 
24, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/antitrust-immunities [https://perma.cc/KVV2-
FUSS]. 
 206. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 169, at 272. See generally Christopher O.B. 
Wright, The National Cooperative Research Act of 1984: A New Antitrust Regime for Joint 
Research and Development Ventures, 1 HIGH TECH. L.J. 133 (1986) (discussing the 
adoption of the NCRPA and the conditions that lead to its adoption). This period in 
American history was characterized by excessive concern over the competitiveness of 
American industry in the face of increasing foreign (particularly Japanese) competition. 
Id. at 139. In addition to the NCRPA, it gave rise to the Patent and Trademark Law 
Amendments Act, more commonly known as the Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. 96-517, 94 Stat. 
3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§	200 to 211 (2012)), which enabled 
universities and other federally-funded researchers to obtain patent protection for their 
discoveries. See supra note 13 (describing collaborations such as Sematech as a response to 
similar concerns). 
 207. National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-42, 107 
Stat. 119 (1993) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§	4301–4306 (2012)) (amending the 
1984 act to add production to the list of protected activities and yielding the commonly-
used acronym “NCRPA”). The Act was further amended in 2004 to add “standards 
development activity” to the activities covered by the Act. Development Organization 
Advancement Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-237, sec.	103(1), §	4301(a)(7), 118 Stat. 661, 663 
(2004) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §	4301(a)(7) (2012)). 
 208. 15 U.S.C. §§	4303, 4305 (2012) (conveying that if a horizontal agreement qualifies 
as a joint venture under the NCRPA, the venturers may provide notice to the attorney 
general and the FTC informing them of the joint venture and its membership, and 
thereafter, any antitrust suit brought against the joint venture will be limited to recovery 
of actual damages and attorney’s fees, rather than the treble damages otherwise available 
under section 15 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §	15 (2012)). 
 209. Id. §	4302. 
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and testing of models, prototypes, equipment, materials, and 
processes, (D) the production of a product, process, or service, 
(E) the testing in connection with the production of a product, 
process, or service by such venture, (F) the collection, 
exchange, and analysis of research or production information, 
or (G) any combination of the purposes specified in 
subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), and (F), and may include 
the establishment and operation of facilities for the conducting 
of such venture, the conducting of such venture on a protected 
and proprietary basis, and the prosecuting of applications for 
patents and the granting of licenses for the results of such 
venture.210 
As noted above, the NCRPA ensures that the collaborative 
activities of joint ventures will be analyzed under the rule of reason. 
In some instances, even behavior that would normally be condemned 
as illegal per se may be permissible when conducted by a joint 
venture. Thus, under the NCRPA, activities including the following 
may be permitted if they are found to be “reasonably required to 
carry out the purpose” of a joint venture: exchanging information 
relating to costs, sales, profitability, prices, marketing, or distribution 
of any product, process, or service; restricting or requiring the sale, 
licensing, or sharing of inventions, developments, products, processes, 
or services not developed through, or produced by, the venture; 
restricting or requiring participation by any party to the venture in 
other R&D activities; allocating markets; or restricting, requiring, or 
otherwise affecting the production of a product, process, or service.211 
2.  Rule of Reason Analysis for Collaborative R&D Arrangements 
Collaborative R&D agreements, both under the Sherman Act 
and the NCRPA, are subject to rule of reason analysis in which 
potential anticompetitive harms are weighed against procompetitive 
benefits. While the analysis of these arrangements falls within the 
general contours of the antitrust rule of reason analysis set forth in 
Section II.A above, there are a number of special considerations that 
arise specifically in the context of collaborative R&D agreements. It 
is the rule of reason, as informed by the special considerations 
discussed below, which provides the foundation for the framework 
that we discuss in Part III. 
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a. Consolidation of Research Operations 
Collaborative R&D arrangements, by their nature, enable 
multiple parties to combine or forgo individual R&D activities in the 
areas addressed by the collaboration. While such consolidation may 
achieve efficiencies of scale, combine technical skill to foster 
increased innovation, and eliminate barriers imposed by blocking 
intellectual property, the combination of formerly competitive R&D 
programs may also pose risks of anticompetitive harm. 
Combining the R&D activities of several competitors, for 
example, is likely to reduce the number of independent lines of 
inquiry pursued by the members of the group.212 While such a 
reduction may eliminate inefficient or unpromising lines of research, 
it is also possible that one of the eliminated lines may have yielded 
the best results. Such combinations may thus lead to lower overall 
levels of innovation and new product development. Eliminating R&D 
competition among collaborators may also reduce incentives to 
improve product quality, to get new and improved products to market 
quickly, and to offer superior customer service. 
These risks are endemic to R&D collaborations, even those with 
the best intentions. The risks are higher when there is a possibility 
that participants in an R&D collaboration may intentionally collude 
to reduce competition. Participants in a collaboration may, for 
example, agree not to innovate in ways that threaten one another’s 
markets or products.213 
From the agencies’ perspectives, one central question in 
evaluating an R&D collaboration is whether it is likely to reduce the 
parties’ incentive or ability to engage in independent R&D, 
presumably in competition with, or complementary to, that of the 
collaboration.214 Anticompetitive effects are more likely to be found 
when a collaborative R&D activity has the potential to reduce the 
parties’ profits in other lines of business (e.g., by rendering an existing 
product line obsolete), “or when a regulatory approval process limits 
the ability of late-comers to catch up with competitors already 
engaged in the R&D.”215 
 
 212. COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 19, §	3.31(a), at 15. 
 213. 13 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 167, ¶	2100e, at 14. 
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 215. See id. 
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b. Exchange of Competitive Information 
As noted in Section II.A, the exchange of information among 
competitors can lead to collusion and generally gives rise to antitrust 
concerns. In R&D collaborations, of course, the exchange of 
information is often essential to achieve the benefits of the 
collaboration.216 The agencies have recognized that sharing of 
information regarding technology, know how, best practices, and 
intellectual property by the parties to an R&D collaboration may be 
necessary to implement the collaborative research program and may 
thus be procompetitive.217 Nevertheless, if the shared information 
includes information related to marketing, product plans, or pricing, 
collusion and other anticompetitive effects may be found.218 
c. Overall Competitive Effect and Procompetitive Benefits 
If a collaboration agreement is likely to have anticompetitive 
effects, the next step in the rule of reason analysis is to determine the 
overall competitive effect of the agreement. This inquiry focuses on 
whether any identifiable efficiency gains stemming from the 
agreement would be enough to offset the agreement’s anticompetitive 
effects.219 
As noted above, numerous procompetitive benefits may arise 
from collaboration agreements. These include spreading the financial 
burden of costly research, combining technical skill and knowledge to 
achieve synergies and promote innovation, enabling the parties to 
engage in research that they might not have been able to conduct 
individually, combining intellectual property to avoid blocking 
positions, accelerating the development of new products, and 
lowering research and production costs through economies of scale.220 
As noted by one agency official, in some cases collaboration may 
even result in “product and service offerings that would be 
completely unavailable without coordination among otherwise 
competitive firms.”221 Thus, even when anticompetitive effects are 
theoretically possible, or even likely, the significant procompetitive 
 
 216. See id. §	3.31(b), at 15. 
 217. Id. 
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 220. See 13 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 167, ¶	2115a, at 111–12; 
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benefits that may arise from R&D collaborations could outweigh the 
harms under a rule of reason analysis. 
3.  The Challenges of Market Definition in R&D Collaborations 
As with other potentially anticompetitive agreements, R&D 
collaborations must be analyzed with respect to their impact on 
defined markets.222 There are two types of markets that must be 
evaluated in connection with R&D collaborations: (1) the market for 
the parties’ and the collaboration’s products and services and (2) the 
market for relevant R&D.223 In terms of the pharmaceutical industry, 
this distinction has been characterized as competition in the 
development of new drugs and competition in the sale of drugs.224 
Below, we discuss the definition of both product and R&D markets in 
the pharmaceutical industry. 
a. Product Markets 
Just as with other agreements among competitors, collaborative 
R&D agreements may have an effect on the product or service 
markets in which the parties compete. Products relevant to an R&D 
collaboration include both the products that the parties to the 
collaboration produce and sell individually, and those that the 
collaboration will produce and sell.225 For example, Firm A is a 
producer of pliable synthetic materials, and Firm B is a producer of 
industrial helium. These two firms form a joint venture to develop 
and produce high-altitude weather balloons. Both the product 
markets for pliable synthetic materials and helium, as well as the 
product market for weather balloons, are implicated in the venture. 
b. R&D Markets 
Cooperative research agreements may affect not only markets 
for products sold by the parties and the collaboration, but the conduct 
of R&D itself. This is a so-called “R&D” or “innovation” market. 
The existence of a “market” in R&D has been recognized both by the 
U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies and in the NCRPA, which 
 
 222. See supra Section II.A. 
 223. COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 19, §	3.32, at 16–17. See supra notes 19 
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 225. COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 19, §	3.32, at 16. 
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requires that the competitive effects of a cooperative research 
arrangement be evaluated “in properly defined, relevant research, 
development, product, process and service markets.”226 
As explained by the agencies, an R&D market comprises “the 
research and development directed to particular new or improved 
goods or processes, and the close substitutes for that research and 
development.”227 Thus, if a collaboration is likely to impair R&D 
relating to future products in a particular field, an R&D market will 
be implicated.228 
Gilbert and Sunshine highlight the potential economic harms 
that may flow from reductions in innovation and the impairment of 
R&D markets with respect to the parties to a potential merger: 
A reduction in innovation may delay improvements in 
production processes that would lower the production costs of 
each of the merging firms, or it may reduce the magnitude of 
such improvements. In addition, a reduction in innovation may 
reduce the likelihood of discovery or delay the introduction by 
each firm of new or improved products. The loss of production 
improvements would result in higher costs, and possibly higher 
prices, even in markets where only one of the merging firms is a 
participant. Similarly, the loss of new or improved products 
would deny consumers the benefits of these improvements in 
every market where the firm is a supplier, including markets 
where only one of the firms is a participant.229 
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merger in 1974). 
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Notwithstanding the theoretical existence of R&D markets, 
identifying and defining these markets in practice has proven 
challenging.230 This is an evolving area of law, with disagreement even 
among antitrust regulators about the appropriate role of antitrust 
laws in regulating R&D markets231 and divergent views regarding the 
market conditions that best foster innovation.232 A recent update to 
the IP Licensing Guidelines attempts to clarify the definition of R&D 
markets, but ultimately does little more than change the terminology 
and provide for more flexibility in analyzing intellectual property 
arrangements that impact R&D markets.233 
As with product markets, agencies seek to define R&D markets 
by reference to “close substitutes.”234 That is, an R&D market will 
include all R&D efforts of similar nature, scope, and magnitude, with 
access to financial resources, necessary intellectual property, and 
skilled personnel, and which have the ability to successfully 
commercialize innovations.235 
To date, most of the controversies involving the definition of 
R&D (or innovation) markets have arisen in the context of proposed 
mergers challenged by the agencies. For example, in 1993, the DOJ 
challenged the proposed acquisition of General Motors’ transmission 
division by ZF Friedrichshafen, a German transmission 
manufacturer.236 Though the transmission businesses of GM and ZF 
overlapped in only a few specific vehicle markets, the DOJ expressed 
concern that ZF would reduce its overall transmission R&D efforts 
after the acquisition, thereby dampening “worldwide technological 
innovation in the design, development, and production 
of	.	.	.	automatic transmissions” for a range of vehicles.237 
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Once an R&D market is defined, as in the analysis of product 
and geographic markets, the competitive impact of the proposed 
agreement on that market must be determined.238 If the parties to the 
agreement collectively control only a small share of the R&D market, 
then anticompetitive harm will be deemed to be unlikely.239 In 
general, the agencies will not challenge a competitor collaboration in 
an R&D market if there are at least three or more independent 
entities outside the collaboration with the incentive or ability to 
engage in R&D that is the same or a close substitute.240 On the other 
hand, if the parties control a large share of the market or hold 
blocking intellectual property positions, then anticompetitive harm is 
likely to be found.241 
4.  Exclusion 
As noted in Section II.A, group boycotts are generally deemed 
to be illegal per se under section 1 of the Sherman Act. A group 
boycott constitutes a concerted refusal by a group of competitors to 
deal with one or more firms for the purpose of suppressing or 
restricting competition.242 These arrangements frequently cut off the 
boycotted firms’ access to a supply, facility, or market necessary for it 
to compete.243 
As with other horizontal arrangements, boycott and exclusion 
issues can arise in the context of collaborative research agreements 
and joint ventures. These issues can arise both with respect to the 
refusal to admit a new member to a venture and the expulsion of an 
existing member from the venture.244 Of course, the goal of 
commercial research is, by definition, to benefit the parties 
conducting the research and disadvantage their competitors. 
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Nevertheless, antitrust issues can arise if the collaborating firms 
possess market power and systematically exclude smaller rivals from 
both participating in the collaboration and accessing its output.245 This 
is particularly true if the output of the collaboration is likely to be of 
significant competitive value (e.g., reducing production costs or 
improving product quality).246 
In many cases, however, the parties to an R&D collaboration 
have no obligation to admit others to their venture, and their refusal 
to do so does not violate the antitrust laws. For example, there are 
numerous legitimate reasons for limiting membership in a joint 
venture to a defined number of participants: the purpose of the 
venture, the ability to govern and administer it in a rational manner, 
the complementarity of skills and experience possessed by the 
existing members, and the expectation that members will contribute 
necessary assets or intellectual property to the venture.247 In general, 
if a refusal to deal is ancillary to a venture’s legitimate goals (e.g., 
reducing costs, improving product quality, or expanding markets), it 
will not raise antitrust concerns under an application of the rule of 
reason.248 Nevertheless, exclusion or expulsion of a party from a 
venture for reasons that are designed to facilitate price fixing, market 
allocation, or other illegal activities will likely be considered illegal.249 
Out of the detailed analysis of the antitrust framework provided 
above we can extract a more specific framework pertinent to pre-
competitive collaborations. Biopharma pre-competitive 
collaborations will, unless they are simply fronts for covert illegal 
activity, are analyzed under a rule of reason framework that includes 
the analysis of factors such as consolidation of research operations 
and exchange of competitive information and pays attention to both 
markets for products and services and markets for relevant R&D. 
Antitrust authorities have responded to concerns about R&D 
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markets primarily in the context of mergers,250 with less attention to 
the impact of R&D collaborations on innovation. Part III discusses 
adapting the existing framework for collaborations among 
competitors to pre-competitive collaborations and extending analysis 
of R&D markets beyond the merger context. We then provide 
hypotheticals that demonstrate its application and from this generate 
some suggested antitrust guidelines for pre-competitive 
collaborations. 
III.  APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST FRAMEWORK TO 
BIOPHARMA PRE-COMPETITIVE COLLABORATIONS 
This Part adapts the antitrust analysis discussed in Part II to pre-
competitive collaborations in the biopharma industry. It then applies 
this analysis to hypothetical examples of pre-competitive 
collaborations, illustrating the potential disconnect between industry 
understandings and uses of pre-competitive to signal procompetitive 
collaborations and the actual analysis conducted by courts and 
agencies to determine whether collaborations among competitors are 
procompetitive or anticompetitive. This Part goes on to identify 
measures that may reduce antitrust concerns in such collaborations, 
including active engagement by governmental agencies, public 
dissemination of data, and the limitation of intellectual property 
encumbrances on resulting innovations. It concludes with suggestions 
for a refocusing of strategies away from efforts to characterize 
collaborations as pre-competitive and towards a reasoned analysis of 
where and how collaborations among competitors can satisfy both 
innovation and competition policy goals. 
A. Analytical Framework for Pre-Competitive Collaborations 
A violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits any 
“contract, combination	.	.	.	or conspiracy, in restraint of trade” 
requires the existence of concerted action among two or more firms 
that is unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions and the 
presence of market power on the part of the actors.251 The act covers 
both horizontal and vertical arrangements. Pre-competitive 
collaborations in the biopharma industry encompass both horizontal 
arrangements (e.g., among groups of pharmaceutical manufacturers) 
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and vertical arrangements (e.g., among research institutions, 
biotechnology firms, and pharmaceutical manufacturers), making an 
analysis of both horizontal and vertical agreements necessary. The 
antitrust inquiry for these arrangements will turn upon both the 
impact on competitive conditions and assessments of market power. 
The first step in the antitrust analysis of a pre-competitive 
collaboration is determining whether the arrangement should be 
deemed illegal per se or examined under a rule of reason analysis. 
The types of collaborative R&D arrangements that would be 
considered in the biopharma industry to be pre-competitive are 
unlikely to trigger concerns of illegality per se and will almost 
certainly be analyzed under the rule of reason.252 The DOJ’s antitrust 
guidelines for collaborations among competitors explicitly recognize 
that many such collaborations “are not only benign but 
procompetitive”253 and should generally be analyzed under the rule of 
reason.254 These guidelines speak particularly favorably of R&D 
collaborations, observing that “[m]ost such agreements are 
procompetitive.”255 Antitrust authorities have been tolerant of 
collaborations among competitors in a variety of contexts, including 
collaborative standard setting and the formation of patent pools, 
suggesting a willingness to look carefully at the efficiency gains that 
such arrangements among competitors may provide.256 Moreover, 
most biopharma pre-competitive collaborations should satisfy the 
requirements of the NCRPA, as discussed in Section II.B.1, enabling 
them to avail themselves of certain protections to ensure that the 
activities of the collaboration will be subject to a rule of reason 
approach. 
The next step is to apply a rule of reason analysis that is 
informed both by the special considerations used by agencies to 
evaluate R&D collaborations among competitors and by factors that 
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are specific to biopharma R&D. While the standard factors guiding a 
rule of reason analysis—including intent of the parties, limitations on 
independence and competition, nature and extent of exchange of 
information, duration, markets and market power, and offsetting 
procompetitive benefits—are applicable, antitrust authorities 
recognize the special nature and needs of R&D intensive markets and 
will tailor their analysis accordingly.257 After determining the relevant 
market(s), the analysis should focus on the effects of the collaboration 
on consolidation of research operations in the relevant market(s), the 
likelihood of exchange of competitive information, and the balancing 
of anticompetitive effects and procompetitive benefits of the 
proposed arrangement.258 The inevitable consolidation of at least 
some R&D activities and the widespread sharing of information that 
takes place within most pre-competitive collaborations should be 
evaluated in terms of its impact on competition, taking potential 
entrants and the magnitude of offsetting efficiency benefits into 
account. 
In determining whether a pre-competitive collaboration is 
procompetitive, courts will consider both the market for the parties’ 
and the collaboration’s products and services, and the impact on the 
market for relevant R&D. In the pharmaceutical industry this 
distinction has been characterized as competition in the development 
of new drugs and competition in the sale of drugs.259 
Product markets relevant to an R&D collaboration include both 
the products that the parties to the collaboration produce and sell 
individually, and those that the collaboration will produce and sell 
collectively. Thus, if parties A and B form a collaboration to develop 
a new type of influenza vaccine, and A agrees as part of the 
collaboration to limit sales of an existing prescription analgesic, which 
competes with B’s over-the-counter analgesic, then both the influenza 
vaccine market (the collaboration’s product) as well as the analgesic 
market (the parties’ independent products) would be implicated. 
Product markets in the pharmaceutical industry have been 
defined according to a variety of criteria, both by courts and agencies. 
According to one 2003 survey, the FTC has defined pharmaceutical 
markets in merger and other cases based on some combination of the 
following factors: 
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(1) whether drugs treat the same disease, condition, or 
indication;260 (2) whether drugs treat a disease by interacting 
with the body in the same manner (i.e., whether they have the 
same “mechanism of action”); (3) whether drugs have the same 
specific chemical compounds; (4) whether drugs have the same 
dosage form such as injectable, liquid, capsule, tablets, or 
topical; (5) whether drugs have the same frequency of dosage, 
such as once-a-day or extended release; (6) whether drugs have 
the same strength of dosage, distinguishing, for example, 30mg 
and 60mg tablets; (7) whether drugs are branded or generic; (8) 
whether drugs require a prescription or are sold over-the-
counter; and (9) whether drugs are currently marketed or are in 
development.261 
The biggest, although not the only, antitrust concern for most 
pre-competitive collaborations will be their likely impact on R&D 
markets. R&D markets are particularly important in the 
pharmaceutical industry. As one commentator recently observed, 
[P]harmaceuticals is an industry that doesn’t lend itself to 
traditional market analysis. Because the bulk of profits in the 
industry come from temporary monopolies—the government-
granted patents—the current marketplace is not where the 
important competition takes place. Rather, the real rivalry 
takes place “upstream,” as companies compete to innovate, 
either by developing medicines in their labs or by buying up 
promising patents and biotech start-ups.262 
Consistent with this observation, almost all recent agency 
challenges raising concerns about effects on R&D markets have 
arisen in the biopharma sector.263 One such challenge, and a good 
example of potential antitrust concern arising from arguably pre-
competitive activity, was the FTC’s 1996 intervention in the proposed 
merger of Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz.264 At the time of the merger, each 
of the parties held U.S. patents critical to the development of then-
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nascent gene therapy technology.265 Since the FDA had not yet 
approved any gene therapy products, no market existed for gene 
therapy products.266 Prior to the proposed merger, Ciba-Geigy and 
Sandoz competed to innovate in this emerging field.267 
Notwithstanding the pre-competitive state of the gene therapy field, 
the FTC was concerned that the combined firm, Novartis, might 
refuse to license its foundational gene therapy patents to others; the 
result would have constrained competition in the gene therapy R&D 
market and limited the future market for gene therapy products.268 In 
response to these concerns, the parties entered into a consent decree 
with the FTC, settling the dispute.269 Under the decree Novartis 
agreed to license its gene therapy patents to Rhone Poulenc, one of 
its principal competitors, thereby preserving at least some 
competition in the market for gene therapy innovation.270 
Once an R&D market is defined, the competitive impact of the 
proposed agreement on that market must be determined. If the 
parties to the agreement collectively control only a small share of the 
R&D market, then anticompetitive harm will be deemed unlikely.271 
In general, the agencies will not challenge a competitor collaboration 
in an R&D market if there are three or more independent entities 
outside the collaboration with the incentive or ability to engage in 
R&D that is the same or a close substitute.272 On the other hand, if 
the parties control a large share of the market or hold blocking 
intellectual property positions, as they did in the Ciba-Geigy merger, 
then anticompetitive harm is likely to be found.273 Given the high 
level of concentration in the industry and the specialized nature of 
drug discovery and development, many of the pre-competitive 
collaborations will involve collaboration among most, if not all, of the 
firms with the ability and incentive to pursue a particular drug. This 
safe harbor-based approach is therefore unlikely to have much effect 
when evaluating pre-competitive collaborations in the biopharma 
industry. 
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Pre-competitive collaborations in this industry create some 
unique challenges for a rule of reason analysis. Many of the 
collaborations will involve consolidation of some aspects of the R&D 
process, including shared clinical trials and shared information about 
possible targets for drug development. Indeed, they are sometimes 
designed specifically to consolidate R&D capabilities of leading 
competitors in order to reduce the cost of maintaining competing 
drug programs. Given the high costs, risks, and uncertainty in drug 
discovery and development, it may sometimes be efficient to allow 
combined research efforts to replace competitive individual efforts. 
But this assessment is difficult to make and requires guessing about 
the best way to achieve pharmaceutical innovation. 
The collaborations will also likely involve the exchange of 
information that may once have been treated by industry members as 
proprietary, although the information is now characterized as pre-
competitive. The boundary between information that is, or is not, 
product specific or competitive in nature and information becomes 
difficult to draw. Moreover, the exchange of information that impacts 
product decisions may be essential to achieve a collaboration’s hoped-
for benefits. While most pre-competitive collaborations currently 
involve sharing of technology, know how, intellectual property, and 
best practices, there is pressure to expand the realm of data sharing 
into areas which are more closely linked to downstream product 
development choices. While antitrust concerns would be raised where 
the shared information related to drug product plans or pricing, it is 
unclear how the boundary between general information about a 
disease and potential pathways for addressing the disease and specific 
information about a potential drug should be drawn in practice. 
Finally, the highly regulated nature of the industry adds to the 
complexity of analyzing how pre-competitive collaborations will 
impact competition. The determination of market power may become 
complicated by the fact that the market works to some degree by 
allowing for limited periods of market power, via patent rights and 
data exclusivity, as mechanisms for encouraging the extensive 
investment needed to develop and sell medical therapies. The market 
thus relies to some extent on the creation of market power as an 
innovation strategy. 
B. Hypothetical Examples and Application of Framework 
The following hypothetical examples illustrate pre-competitive 
collaborations at various stages during the drug discovery and 
development cycle. Each example highlights different aspects of the 
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disconnect between assumptions about pre-competitive 
collaborations and antitrust concerns regarding whether 
collaborations are procompetitive or anticompetitive. The first 
example applies the framework that the agencies would use to 
evaluate whether a collaboration raises antitrust concerns.274 The 
subsequent examples illustrate some of the different concerns that 
may arise in alternative types of collaborative arrangements. 
 
Example 1: Pre-Competitive Does Not Always Mean Procompetitive 
Six pharmaceutical firms that collectively account for more than 
ninety percent of private U.S. R&D spending on Parkinson’s disease 
enter into a ten-year collaboration agreement. There are no effective 
treatments for Parkinson’s disease on the market. Before the 
collaboration, each member pursued independent and proprietary 
research designed to identify and validate biomarkers useful in 
measuring the progression of Parkinson’s disease and the effects of 
experimental treatments on the progression of the disease. During the 
collaboration they will pursue joint research studies and clinical trials 
to identify and validate biomarkers for Parkinson’s disease. They 
form a separate organization that they will jointly control in order to 
collect and manage tissue samples and data generated by their jointly 
conducted studies and clinical trials. They will share the results of 
their joint studies and clinical trials with the public on a no-cost basis 
through a project portal they collectively fund and control. 
Discussion: In this example, the collaboration involves sharing 
information and capabilities relating to the design of new drugs to 
diagnose and treat Parkinson’s disease. Although there is no current 
product market, the relevant antitrust inquiry involves a 
determination of the nature and likely impact on an R&D market.275 
In conducting this analysis, the first step considers the relevant R&D 
market, then identifies which entities are actual or likely potential 
competitors of the collaboration. As discussed in Part II, an R&D 
market “consists of the research and development directed to 
particular new or improved goods or processes, and the close 
substitutes for that research and development.”276 Thus, the R&D 
market in question could be broadly defined as the market for 
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developing new diagnostics and drugs for Parkinson’s disease or, even 
more broadly, for Parkinson’s disease and other related neuromotor 
disorders. 
Once the relevant R&D market is defined, the analysis requires 
assessing whether the collaboration is likely to have anticompetitive 
effects in the defined market. In undertaking this analysis, attention 
must be given both to the potential effects on competition between 
the collaboration and non-participants and competition among the 
participants. Relevant factors in both of these areas are the degree of 
concentration in the market, the market share of the collaboration 
participants, and the presence of independent entities with 
comparable capabilities and incentives to engage in comparable 
R&D. 
When considering competition between the collaboration and 
others, market concentration must be assessed. Where there are at 
least four independent entities with comparable capabilities and 
incentives to conduct R&D efforts that are close substitutes for the 
R&D to be conducted by the collaboration, the collaboration will 
ordinarily be found not to adversely impact competition in the 
specified market. In this example, most of the firms currently engaged 
in Parkinson’s research will be part of the collaboration, arguably 
limiting independent competition in this research area. However, the 
analysis must also consider the likelihood that other pharmaceutical 
firms will enter this R&D market to compete with the collaboration. 
The likelihood of independent market entry will depend on factors 
including the ability of the collaboration to block independent entry 
by using patents or other intellectual property barriers. In this 
example, if the collaborators possess key patents relating to the 
treatment of Parkinson’s disease, then antitrust concerns may arise, as 
they did in In re Ciba-Geigy Limited.277 
Attention must also be paid to the potential effect of the 
collaboration on the independent R&D efforts of the collaborators, 
and whether the collaboration is likely to incentivize the participants 
to reduce investment in or diminish the speed or scope of their 
independent R&D efforts. Given that the likely goals of the 
collaboration are to eliminate duplicative R&D activity, achieve 
economies of scale, and consolidate all Parkinson’s-related R&D in 
the collaboration, participants will likely reduce their independent 
R&D efforts. 
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Given these potential competition-reducing effects, the 
collaboration will likely be found to create a significant risk of 
anticompetitive harm in the defined R&D market. In applying rule of 
reason analysis, these risks must then be weighed against the potential 
procompetitive benefits arising from the collaboration. Examples of 
such benefits might include the potential for combining 
complementary assets and resources to produce an innovation 
outcome faster, at lower cost, and/or to increase the likelihood of a 
successful outcome. In this example the collaboration is being formed 
to share costs and risks at early stages of product development in 
order to improve the likelihood of success of each individual 
participant in its own product development activities at later stages of 
product development. 
While these procompetitive benefits may result in the 
collaboration passing antitrust muster, this result is not guaranteed. 
Thus, careful attention must be paid to the terms of the collaboration 
agreement, and measures should be taken to ensure that the 
agreement’s procompetitive benefits outweigh its potential 
anticompetitive harm. For example, the collaborators may consider 
offering to license blocking patents on Parkinson’s research to other 
market participants.278 The most important lesson from this example 
is that even early-stage collaborations directed toward R&D in pre-
competitive markets may result in anticompetitive effects. Ultimately 
the fact that a collaboration is pre-competitive does not ensure that it 
will be deemed to be procompetitive. 
 
Example 2: Early Stage Does Not Always Mean Pre-Competitive 
Three leading biotechnology firms, together accounting for 
seventy-five percent of the current industry spending on investment in 
developing a biologic treatment for a rare but deadly form of lung 
cancer, enter into a collaboration agreement. They agree to share all 
research data that they have previously acquired from their own 
clinical trials conducted using drug candidates that were ultimately 
not approved due to poor efficacy.279 They also commit to sharing 
samples and conducting joint studies to narrow the most promising 
 
 278. See supra notes 268–73 and accompanying text. 
 279. Though the public disclosure of summary clinical trials data on NIH’s 
ClinicalTrials.gov website is required by law, the vast majority of clinical trials data 
remains private. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 
110-85, §	801, 121 Stat. 823, 904–22 (2007) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §	282(j) 
(2012)). See generally INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 17 (outlining 
guiding principles and a framework for the responsible sharing of clinical trial data). 
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approach to find treatments for the disease. They will not make the 
results of their collaboration public. There are two other smaller firms 
in the industry pursuing R&D programs for the same rare form of 
lung cancer. These firms have not been included in the collaboration. 
There are currently no approved drugs on the market to treat this 
form of lung cancer and none of the participating firms have active 
clinical trials, but they all have potential drug candidates that they are 
in the early stages of researching. 
Discussion: In this example, as in the previous one, the 
collaboration involves sharing information and capabilities that relate 
to the design of new, currently non-existent, products, and the 
relevant inquiry will focus on determining the nature and likely 
impact on an R&D market. Here, the products are biological 
treatments for a particular form of lung cancer. There are four 
important differences between this example and the prior one, 
however: (1)	the exclusion of competitors from the collaboration; 
(2)	the failure to share the collaboration data and results with 
competitors or more broadly with the public; (3)	the focus on 
achieving cost savings by sharing proprietary data and limiting 
research paths rather than on collaborating to produce new results; 
and (4)	the absence of a separate governance structure to separate 
collaborative and competitive activities. These differences create 
strong antitrust concerns that are not meaningfully mitigated by the 
pre-competitive nature of the collaboration. 
As in the previous example, the antitrust analysis will focus on 
the nature and likely impact of the agreement on an R&D market, 
which could be broadly defined as the market for developing new 
treatments for this specific form of lung cancer or for this and a 
related class of cancers. The next step is to determine whether the 
collaboration is likely to have anticompetitive effects in the defined 
market, including any impact on competition among the participants 
and competition with non-participants. This collaboration raises 
concerns about both types of competition. First, it may reduce the 
number of R&D paths being pursued by the participants—indeed, 
this is one of the intended goals. Participants are sharing proprietary 
clinical trial data with each other and are committing to joint studies 
to narrow the development paths that they will pursue. Second, the 
collaboration may have negative effects on competition with non-
participants. The collaboration includes the three largest firms and 
excludes two smaller competitors. Although the presence of these two 
competitors may reduce competition concerns by preserving 
independent R&D paths, the concentration of resources caused by 
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this collaboration may leave the existing competitors at a 
disadvantage. If the collaboration negatively impacts these 
competitors, they may have difficulty staying in the market, and 
potential entry may be deterred. 
Third, the nature of the arrangement seems to be primarily 
focused on achieving cost savings from consolidating research efforts 
and avoiding duplicate clinical trials rather than on encouraging more 
and faster innovation. The collaborators are sharing previously 
generated data with each other rather than focusing on future jointly 
generated data, and they are committing to joint studies that may 
limit the number of R&D paths that they pursue. Private cost savings 
are not regarded as sufficient procompetitive justification for an 
otherwise anticompetitive arrangement. 
Finally, the structure of the collaboration does not include 
protections that might limit the sharing of competitive information 
across firms. There is no independent governance structure for the 
collaboration that could serve to separate the joint R&D efforts from 
competitive product development activities. 
In this example the collaboration is justified largely on efficiency 
grounds. It eliminates duplication and waste, may make developing a 
drug more cost effective and may accelerate discovery of an effective 
treatment. But rather than pooling efforts to generate new ideas, this 
hypothetical involves sharing proprietary information to reduce the 
number of paths being pursued. This may well increase efficiency, but 
is this collaboration the least restrictive way of achieving these 
efficiency benefits? Are the restrictions imposed on entry and data 
sharing reasonably necessary to achieve these benefits? This 
collaboration would likely cause antitrust concern. 
Even more than the previous example, this example shows that 
early-stage collaborations directed toward R&D in pre-competitive 
markets may result in anticompetitive effects. 
 
Example 3: Late Stage Collaborations May Not Be Pre-Competitive, 
But May Nonetheless Be Procompetitive 
Two of the pharmaceutical industry’s largest firms, A and B, 
have approved therapies on the market to treat a new and widespread 
strain of influenza (strain HxNy), representing fifty-five percent of 
the total market. Comparable products are marketed by three other 
firms. The market leader, Firm C, has the only influenza drug 
approved for use in children and also accounts for thirty-five percent 
of the adult market. A and B wish to form a collaboration to combine 
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their influenza HxNy R&D efforts to develop a safe and effective 
treatment for influenza HxNy in children. In the past, A and B have 
each individually approached C regarding the cross-licensing of 
patents and data that C holds relating to its influenza HxNy products, 
but C is not willing to entertain licensing discussions. 
The collaboration will be conducted through a new joint venture 
entity (“JV”) in which A and B will each hold a fifty percent share. 
JV will own all intellectual property arising from the collaboration 
and will manufacture and market any new product that is developed. 
As part of the collaboration, A and B will share research data that 
they formerly treated as confidential and will exclusively license their 
influenza-related patents to JV. A and B each agree that they will not 
admit any other pharmaceutical manufacturer into JV or share data 
or results with any other firm unless both parties and JV agree to do 
so. 
Discussion: This example involves current product markets. 
Though A and B collectively control fifty-five percent of the total 
influenza HxNy therapy market, their collaboration will focus on 
juvenile influenza treatments. In the market for juvenile influenza 
HxNy treatments, Firm C controls one hundred percent of the 
market, and both A and B have zero percent. They wish to combine 
resources in order to compete more effectively with C, which 
currently enjoys a natural monopoly in this area and has proven 
unwilling to assist market entry through patent licensing. As such, the 
collaboration of A and B is unlikely to have adverse effects on 
competition and instead is likely to result in new products that 
increase competition in this market and thereby improve consumer 
choice, reduce prices, and improve quality. Moreover, due to the low 
market share currently held by A and B in the affected market, the 
agencies are unlikely to investigate or challenge the collaboration 
absent some evidence of other illegal activity.280 Given the substantial 
outlays that A and B are likely to make with respect to this 
collaboration, it is not unreasonable for them to close their venture to 
newcomers who have not invested in the project from the outset.281 
This example illustrates that a collaboration between 
competitors may be procompetitive even if it relates to activity that is 
beyond the pre-competitive stage and, more importantly, that 
 
 280. See supra note 199 and accompanying text (noting agencies are unlikely to 
challenge a collaboration controlling less than twenty percent of the relevant market). 
 281. See supra notes 247–49 and accompanying text (discussing exclusion from 
collaborations). 
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beneficial collaborations should not be avoided simply because they 
are perceived not to be pre-competitive. 
 
Example 4: Rules Requiring Immediate Data Disclosure and Limiting 
the Ability to Patent May Not Always Be Procompetitive 
Six of the pharmaceutical industry’s largest firms, accounting for 
sixty-five percent of the private sector R&D efforts to develop 
treatments for Alzheimer’s disease, create a collaboration that is open 
to all industry stakeholders. Four of these six firms have existing 
treatments for Alzheimer’s disease on the market, but these 
treatments only reduce the symptoms and or delay the onset of the 
disease; they do not prevent or cure it. To make joining the 
collaboration attractive, the six firms agree to share all of the data 
that they have gathered from past clinical trials on failed Alzheimer’s 
drug candidates with other members of the collaboration. They also 
agree to share all of the information they have or acquire during the 
term of the collaboration that is useful in identifying and validating 
novel biomarkers for Alzheimer’s disease. In order to join the 
collaboration, participants must agree to a data sharing policy that 
includes requirements (a) to share all research results that fall within 
the scope of the collaboration with collaboration members and (b) to 
grant the other collaborators a royalty-free license to intellectual 
property that may encompass the activities of the collaboration. The 
results of the collaboration will be shared only with members of the 
collaboration that have agreed to these terms. The collaboration has 
no specified end date, and may be dissolved only upon an affirmative 
vote of all members. 
Discussion: The analysis will focus on the effects of this 
collaboration on the market for R&D relating to treatments for 
Alzheimer’s disease and, perhaps, related dementias. The firms that 
have formed the collaboration do not account for all of the market, 
but the goal of the collaboration is to encourage entry by all actual 
and potential competitors in the R&D market for Alzheimer’s drugs. 
This example primarily involves R&D markets, although it may have 
product market effects due to the existence of related products owned 
by participants. The analysis will turn on a comparison of the 
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of the proposed 
arrangement. 
This collaboration involves a pooling of resources but may not 
result in a consolidation of R&D paths. Indeed, the hope might be 
that by sharing some basic inputs needed to identify possible 
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products, the result will be to increase the number of R&D paths. At 
first glance this would seem like a procompetitive arrangement, 
focusing on enlarging the public domain of knowledge in a complex 
disease area. The focus is on identifying and validating biomarkers 
that will be useful to different firms pursuing different competitive 
products. Entry is not restricted, and data and intellectual property 
relevant to the collaboration is shared freely with anyone who wants 
to join. 
But there are also more subtle competition concerns. The 
collaboration requires a substantial amount of information sharing 
that may include competitive information about project design and 
selection. It also involves broad intellectual property sharing 
agreements, which is limited to collaboration members. These 
requirements could lead to an increase in the concentration of 
competitively significant assets among participants. The agreement 
may also reflect a plan of strategically forfeiting rights to preempt 
competitor intellectual property positions. The requirement will have 
a distinct impact on different industry members by making certain 
kinds of biological data freely available within the group while 
preserving rights over other kinds of data. The presence of this type 
of arrangement could limit entry into the market because small firms 
cannot get access to the data they need without giving up their own 
competitive advantage in the form of proprietary data and intellectual 
property rights. 
This example illustrates that open participation and a focus on 
freely sharing early stage research results, hallmarks of many pre-
competitive collaborations, do not guarantee that the collaboration 
will be procompetitive. 
C. Recommended Practices for Pre-Competitive Research 
Collaborations 
The above analyses demonstrate that R&D collaborations in the 
biopharma industry need to be structured with antitrust concerns in 
mind. In this final Section we suggest guidelines for mitigating 
antitrust concerns for industry participants seeking to form new R&D 
collaborations or to improve existing collaborations. The following 
suggestions are derived from the antitrust framework applicable to 
such collaborations and reflect areas where competitive concerns 
might arise. 
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1.  Nature and Scope of the Collaboration 
Antitrust concerns can arise from both the consolidation of 
actual or potentially competitive research operations and the 
potential impact of the collaboration on the markets of the 
participants in the collaboration.282 The nature and scope of the 
collaboration should be designed with both concerns in mind. 
Antitrust concerns with the consolidation of R&D capabilities 
will be greatest when the collaboration involves a combination of 
formerly competitive R&D programs or a merging of the specialized 
R&D resources of those firms most likely to engage in developing a 
particular product. Whenever possible, collaborations should be 
limited to areas in which the participants are not actively competing. 
Efforts should be made to compartmentalize the R&D process into 
areas in which cooperation is essential to solve a common roadblock 
or provide a particular input to the development process at a 
reasonable cost. These efforts should not affect areas in which 
competition in the R&D process will remain. 
One central question in evaluating an R&D collaboration is 
whether it is likely to reduce the parties’ incentive or ability to engage 
in independent R&D, presumably in competition with or 
complementary to that of the collaboration. Care should be taken not 
to limit competitive activity outside of the sphere of agreed 
cooperation. While cooperation may occur in later stages of product 
development, it should not extend into areas where parties are 
competing. Rather collaboration should relate to areas that are not 
product-specific. 
Anticompetitive effects are more likely to be found when a 
collaborative R&D activity has the potential to reduce the parties’ 
profits in other lines of business. For example, when firms are already 
selling a drug to treat a disease but seek to discover and develop a 
new and better drug, they may not have strong enough incentives to 
invest in the potential new drug. Indeed, they may have incentives to 
delay the development of new drugs. To alleviate concerns, 
collaborations could be limited to areas where pooling of resources 
and expertise is necessary to solve a problem or produce results that 
are too difficult, risky, and expensive for individual firms to reach 
alone; ensuring that these benefits are made widely available to 
existing firms and potential entrants may also reduce these concerns. 
But collaborations that are targeted in areas that are unlikely to 
 
 282. See supra Section II.B.2 (discussing rule of reason analysis for R&D 
collaborations). 
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cannibalize the markets of existing participants will create fewer 
antitrust concerns. 
It is critical to preserve meaningful independent decision making 
authority over product development choices. Limitations on 
independent decision making within the collaboration should be 
minimal and should be confined to those areas of decision making 
that involve the sharing and use of pooled resources. 
When considering the scope of the collaboration, it is important 
to consider not only the activities covered but also the likely duration 
of the collaboration. Unless there is a compelling reason not to, 
collaborations should have a limited duration that is justified in terms 
of a reasonable timeline for achieving defined goals. Many early pre-
competitive collaborations were defined around discrete projects with 
a time horizon of five years or less.283 Collaborations of ten years or 
more might be considered to be mergers, depending on the nature of 
the collaboration.284 One of the challenges in evaluating new forms of 
collaboration is uncertainty about their impact on innovation. 
Limiting the duration of arrangements and encouraging 
experimentation with alternative forms will provide important 
information about the benefits and costs of these arrangements 
before anticompetitive harm develops. Overall, shorter duration is 
likely to be regarded more favorably from an antitrust standpoint. 
2.  Organization and Governance 
Pre-competitive collaborations will inevitably involve some 
consolidation of R&D programs and product-specific assets. The risks 
of this kind of consolidation are higher when there is a possibility that 
participants may intentionally collude to reduce competition. The 
collaboration should thus be structured and governed with an 
emphasis, whenever possible, on openness (both in terms of 
participation and in terms of access to results), transparency, and 
independence from individual competitive concerns. 
 
 283. Based upon a review of the websites of many of the biopharma pre-competitive 
collaborations, most are organized into projects or phases with a term of no more than five 
years. This includes TSC, one of the earliest examples, as well as the AMP, one of the 
most recent examples. See, e.g., Thorisson & Stein, supra note 88, at 124; Accelerating 
Medicines Partnership, supra note 139. For a summary of some pre-competitive 
collaborations in this space, see ERIC GASTFRIEND & BRYAN LEE, PRECOMPETITIVE 
COLLABORATIONS IN PHARMA: AN OVERVIEW STUDY (2015), http://futureoflife.org/
data/documents/PreCompetitiveCollaborationInPharmaIndustry.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FYZ
-6GNP] (summarizing some of the early and current pre-competitive collaborations with 
links to project sites). 
 284. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
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Entry and Exit: Unless there are strong reasons for limiting 
participation, a collaboration should be open to any industry member 
with the relevant expertise and interest. Exclusion of actual or 
potential competitors from the collaboration could impair 
competition, and any limitation on participation should be justifiable 
on efficiency or other legitimate grounds. Anticompetitive effects are 
more likely to be found when a regulatory approval process limits the 
ability of non-participants or late-comers to catch up with competitors 
already engaged in the R&D process, making it even more important 
to allow open entry when possible. Sharing the results with the public 
quickly and without restriction may offset some of the concerns of 
limited entry. Similarly, barriers to exit should be avoided to reduce 
the risk that potential competitors are prevented from pursuing their 
own projects if and when they deem the collaboration no longer to be 
desirable. 
Public Sector Participants: Participation in a collaboration by 
governmental agencies and other public sector actors may be viewed 
favorably from an antitrust perspective. If government actors are 
actively engaged in the organization and have some ability to 
participate in, or at least review, the decisions that are made by the 
leadership of the organization, they will have the ability to monitor 
the behavior of competitors. They will also have a greater ability to 
ensure that the activities of the collaboration are designed with the 
broader public interest in mind. 
Independent Leadership: The organization should ideally have 
independent leadership and counsel independent of any of the 
participants, as well as a clear and transparent system of governance. 
There should be a balanced representation of interests on the 
governing board to avoid allegations of capture and abuse of voting 
processes.285 
Legal Documentation: The collaboration should have clear rules 
governing the sharing and use of resources and results and should 
have an antitrust compliance policy in place. 
3.  Sharing (and Not Sharing) Information and Results 
Rules governing what information and results are to be shared, 
as well as rules governing what kinds of information cannot be 
shared, are both critical to the collaboration. Antitrust issues can arise 
 
 285. Cf. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 511 (1988) 
(condemning petitioner who packed standards-setting group with voting members who 
“shar[ed] their economic interest in restraining competition”). 
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when there is an exchange of competitive information among 
participants in a collaboration. If the shared information includes 
information related to marketing, product plans, or pricing, collusion 
and other anticompetitive effects may be found. The collaboration 
should thus have strict policies prohibiting the exchange of this kind 
of competitive information. This process may require limiting 
company personnel who are involved in proprietary activities from 
also engaging in areas of shared R&D. 
Moving to rules governing what is shared, there are clear benefits 
from an antitrust perspective in making the data and intellectual 
property generated by a collaboration freely and publicly available 
without undue delay. This practice keeps both members and non-
members of the collaboration on an equal footing when they are 
competing in product and R&D markets. Collaborations should 
consider requiring the public release of data and rules limiting 
intellectual property protection for broad research platform and 
research tools, possibly after an exclusive member period if needed to 
allow for the opportunity to publish first on research results. To the 
extent that rules limiting participants’ ability to obtain intellectual 
property protection are not feasible, collaborations should consider 
rules that require licensing relevant intellectual property broadly and 
non-exclusively if it is critical to R&D markets. An analogy could be 
drawn to the fair and reasonable non-discriminatory royalty 
requirements that have emerged in standard setting organizations.286 
4.  Require More Careful Delineation of Procompetitive Benefits 
Pre-competitive collaborations are justified most often in terms 
of the efficiency gains stemming from the collaboration. But these 
justifications are often made without a careful analysis and 
comparison of identifiable efficiencies with the actual and potential 
costs arising from limitations on competition. The measures discussed 
above, including limited scope and duration, broad participation that 
includes public and private actors, and the public release and sharing 
of data and intellectual property, may serve to limit the potential 
negative effects on innovation. Requiring collaborations to be specific 
about the economic and scientific benefits of the collaborative 
activities that they propose may impose needed discipline on those 
seeking to form collaborations, as well as provide antitrust authorities 
 
 286. See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards and Bioinformatics, in 
BIOINFORMATICS LAW: LEGAL ISSUES FOR COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY IN THE POST-
GENOME ERA 113, 123 (Jorge L. Contreras & A. James Cuticchia eds., 2013). 
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with useful data as they evaluate the collaboration. Requiring 
collaborations to limit activities to those areas where the desired 
results are unlikely to be reached through individual efforts and/or 
will not be reached within a reasonable time or at a reasonable cost 
will further increase the likelihood that the collaborations will be 
viewed as procompetitive. 
CONCLUSION 
Both federal agencies and industry participants have turned to 
new forms of collaboration to increase the efficiency and effectiveness 
of biomedical research. Industry participants, many of them 
competitors, come together to define joint R&D objectives and share 
project results in what are widely known as pre-competitive 
collaborations. Their actions suggest a prevailing belief that these pre-
competitive endeavors are not only permissible but encouraged. In 
contrast, neither the courts nor the federal agencies charged with 
enforcing U.S. antitrust laws have recognized pre-competitive activity 
as immune from antitrust challenge. Rather, the DOJ and FTC, in the 
guidance that they have provided regarding collaborations among 
competitors, have repeatedly emphasized that anticompetitive 
behavior may arise at many stages, from early R&D to final product 
marketing and sales. Thus, while many pre-competitive collaborations 
may offer significant procompetitive benefits and thereby avoid 
antitrust concern, it is not the case that every collaboration conducted 
prior to product release or as part of a common technology platform 
will be immune from antitrust liability. Accordingly, the prevailing 
intuition within the biopharma and other industries that pre-
competitive collaborations enjoy some form of antitrust safe harbor is 
misguided. Far from being benign, this misconception has the 
potential both to encourage early-stage collaborations that may in 
fact be anticompetitive and discourage later-stage, yet manifestly 
procompetitive, collaborations. 
This Article shows that pre-competitive collaborations may not 
always result in significant procompetitive benefits and, conversely, 
that collaborations conducted at later stages of the product 
development life cycle, though not pre-competitive, may actually 
yield substantial procompetitive benefits. Thus, in the critical search 
for more effective and rapid forms of collaboration in the biopharma 
and other industries, we urge policymakers and industry leaders to 
shed any undue reliance on the notion of pre-competition as a salve 
for antitrust concern and instead to analyze potential collaborations 
using the rule of reason framework long recognized by antitrust law 
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and policy. The infusion of traditional antitrust analysis into current 
debates regarding the desirability of various forms of industry 
collaboration will improve resulting collaborative structures and 
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